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6.1 Introduction
Unlike other major means-tested transfers, no low-income housing pro-
gram is an entitlement for any type of household. Despite the failure to
serve all eligible households who want to participate, federal, state, and lo-
cal governments in the United States spend substantially more on housing
subsidies to the poor than on other better-known parts of the welfare sys-
tem such as food stamps and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF). The most widely cited ﬁgures for government expenditures on
housing subsidies refer to the direct expenditures of the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). They ignore the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) programs that account for about 20 per-
cent of all subsidized units, the tax expenditures on the Low-Income Hous-
ing Tax Credit ($3.5 billion per year in 2000 and growing rapidly), the
expenditures of state and local governments often funded by block grants
from the federal government, and the many indirect subsidies such as local
property tax exemptions and abatements received by all public housing
projects and many privately owned projects, the federal income tax ex-
emption of interest on the bonds issued by state and local governments to
ﬁnance housing projects, and the underpriced mortgage insurance re-
ceived by many privately owned projects.
Given the enormous amount of money that has been spent on means-
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Jim Wallace, and John Weicher for helpful conversations.tested housing assistance over the years, the amount of research on the
most important eﬀects of these programs is shockingly small. There is no
evidence on the eﬀects of some major programs and little evidence on the
eﬀects of other large programs. For example, there are only two studies of
the most important eﬀects of Section 236, a program that still serves al-
most a million people. There are almost no studies of the important eﬀects
of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), a program that has been
the fastest-growing housing program over the last decade accounting for
the majority of additional recipients of housing subsidies. The evidence on
the most heavily studied programs is old. For example, the studies of the
eﬀects of the public housing program on housing consumption are based
on data from 1965 through 1977. At the midpoint of this period, the me-
dian age of public housing units was ten years. Today, the median age is
about thirty years. It stands to reason that the eﬀect of public housing on
the housing consumption of tenants is very diﬀerent today from what it
was at the time of these studies. Since direct HUD expenditure on public
housing in the form of operating and modernization subsidies is about $6
billion annually and the real resource cost of continuing to use these units
to house low-income households is much larger due to their opportunity
cost and the substantial local property tax abatement that they receive, this
is a sad state of aﬀairs.
If a housing program consists of a set of eligible households and suppli-
ers operating under one set of rules, the United States has had an enor-
mous number of programs intended to improve the housing of low-income
households since the federal government became seriously involved in this
activity in 1937. There have been many programs as this term is commonly
used, each of these programs has typically had a number of variants, and
each change in the regulations produces a new program. For example, the
public housing program has at least twenty-nine variants. Each has its own
rules, and these rules have changed from time to time, although they have
many rules in common.
To keep the length of this paper within reasonable limits, it will focus on
four broad programs that account for the bulk of all subsidized rentalunits.
These programs are public housing, project-based assistance under the
Section 236 and Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation
Programs, and tenant-based assistance under the Section 8 Existing Hous-
ing Program. They illustrate the three basic approaches that have been
used to provide housing assistance: government ownership and operation
of housing newly built for occupancy by low-income households; govern-
ment contracts with private parties to build (or substantially rehabilitate)
and operate housing for these households; and subsidies to eligible house-
holds who select housing in the private market meeting certain minimum
quality standards and, under some variants, other restrictions. These pro-
grams account for about 70 percent of all subsidized rentalunits and about
366 Edgar O. Olsen50 percent of all units for low-income households that have received fed-
eral housing subsidies.
Even though there have been almost no studies of their major eﬀects, a
more comprehensive paper would have devoted considerable attention to
the LIHTC program (that serves more than a million households and has
been growing rapidly since 1988), Section 515 (a rental housing program
operated by the USDA in rural areas and small towns that produces few
new units each year but still serves more than half a million households),
and the HOME housing block grant program from the federal government
to state and local housing agencies on which we currently spend about
$1.85 billion annually, primarily for project-based assistance. In light of the
continuing interest in increasing the homeownership rate of the near poor,
it would also be desirable to devote considerable attention to several fairly
large homeownership programs—HUD’s Section 235 program, which
provided subsidies to about a half a million households since 1969, and
USDA’s Section 502 program, which has subsidized almost two million
households since 1949 and currently provides subsidies to about half a mil-
lion households.
The primary purposes of this paper are to (a) consider the arguments
that have been oﬀered for housing subsidies to low-income households and
the implications of valid arguments for the evaluation and design of hous-
ing programs, (b) describe the most important features of the largest rental
housing programs for low-income households in the United States, (c)
summarize the empirical evidence on the major eﬀects of these programs,
and (d) analyze the most important options for reform of the system of
housing subsidies to low-income households. The eﬀects of these programs
that will be considered include eﬀects on the housing occupied by recipi-
ents of the subsidy and their consumption of other goods, eﬀects on labor
supply of recipients, the participation rates of diﬀerent types of house-
holds, the distribution of beneﬁts among recipients and all eligible house-
holds, eﬀects on the types of neighborhoods in which subsidized house-
holds live and the eﬀect of subsidized housing and households on their
neighbors, eﬀects on the rents of unsubsidized units, and the cost-
eﬀectiveness of alternative methods for delivering housing assistance.
Since we continue to seriously consider or embark upon new programs that
have the same basic features of older programs and the major eﬀects of the
newer programs have not been estimated, an understanding of the older
programs is highly relevant for current discussions of housing policy.
Section 6.2 discusses the justiﬁcations for housing subsidies for low-
income households and goals consistent with these justiﬁcations, gives a
brief overview of the development of the current system of housing subsi-
dies, and describes in more detail the development and most important
rules of the major rental housing programs. Section 6.3 provides informa-
tion about the number of households served by major programs, direct
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households assisted. Section 6.4 discusses what can be said on theoretical
grounds about the eﬀects of the programs and reviews the evidence on
these eﬀects. Section 6.5 analyzes options for reform of the system of hous-
ing subsidies to low-income households. Section 6.6 summarizes the major
results.
6.2 Program Justiﬁcations, Goals, History, and Rules
6.2.1 Justiﬁcations and Goals
Without a clear understanding of the justiﬁcations for government ac-
tivity in a particular area, it is diﬃcult (but not impossible) to conduct an
incisive evaluation of current programs or design better programs. For ex-
ample, a person who has not thought seriously about the justiﬁcations for
housing subsidies to low-income households might imagine that a housing
program for these households is successful if it induces them to occupy bet-
ter housing. However, a program of cash grants with no strings attached
would have this eﬀect for all recipients whose income elasticity of demand
for housing is positive—that is, almost everyone. Indeed, it would be pos-
sible to devise a subsidy that led to a smaller improvement in housing for
all recipients than would result from an equally costly lump-sum grant. A
subsidy equal to a fraction of expenditure on all goods except housing
would have this eﬀect for recipients whose price elasticity of demand for
these other goods is less than one. Should this be considered a successful
housing program?
In general, a justiﬁcation for a government program is an explanation of
why we should have a program of that type. Obviously, this involves value
judgments. The value judgment underlying this paper is that we should
have a program of a particular type if and only if an appropriately designed
program of that type will lead to an eﬃcient allocation of resources that is
preferred by everyone to the allocation in the absence of government ac-
tion. Although this simple view leaves much to be desired because it ig-
nores the impact of the multiplicity of external eﬀects, market imperfec-
tions, and informational problems that justify other programs and hence
the design of a set of programs to deal simultaneously with all of these
problems, it is at least a step in the direction of clear thinking about policy
evaluation and design.
The major justiﬁcation for housing subsidies to low-income households
is that some taxpayers care about these households but feel that at least
some low-income households undervalue housing. If some taxpayers feel
this way while others are either completely selﬁsh or nonpaternalistic al-
truists, it is possible for the government to achieve an eﬃcient allocation
and to make everyone better oﬀ as they judge their own well-being by pro-
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Politicians and lobbyists for housing subsidies rarely use this argument be-
cause it is insulting to potential supporters. However, conversations with
ordinary citizens about why they prefer to provide housing assistance
rather than cash grants usually leads to this argument.
It is clear that paternalistic altruists do not think that all low-income
households undervalue housing. In recent years, proponents of housing
subsidies have frequently argued that the primary housing problem of low-
income households is an excessive rent-income ratio rather that inadequate
housing. That is, the majority of low-income households occupy adequate
housing by spending too much of their income on it and hence too little on
other goods. People who make this argument must be saying that these
low-income households undervalue other goods. If we want to attain an
eﬃcient allocation of resources that is preferred by everyone to the alloca-
tion in the absence of government action, we must provide nonhousing,
rather than housing, subsidies to this group. The implications of these feel-
ings for housing policy are not clear. If housing programs are designed to
deal with both poor housing and excessive rent burden, what is the role of
food stamps, Medicaid, and other programs designed to subsidize various
nonhousing goods?
It is often claimed that housing subsidies to low-income households are
justiﬁed by more tangible externalities. For example, it has been argued that
better housing for low-income families leads to better health for its occu-
pants and, since some diseases are contagious, to better health for the
middle- and upper-income families with whom they come in contact. Im-
provements in the exterior appearance of housing confer beneﬁts on others.
Available evidence suggests that some such externalities exist but that their
magnitudes are small (Weicher 1979, 489–92). If the goal of housing subsi-
dies is to make both recipients and taxpayers better oﬀ, it is doubtful that
substantial expenditure can be justiﬁed on the basis of these externalities.
Some argue for particular housing programs based on their eﬀects on
the members of subsidized households without specifying the nature of the
external eﬀect or market imperfection involved and without considering
whether the housing program involved is a part of an eﬃcient strategy for
dealing with these market failures. For example, many consider a positive
eﬀect of a housing program on the educational attainment of children in
the subsidized household to be a justiﬁcation for the program. This argu-
ment alone does not justify government action.
No attempt has been made to derive implications for the evaluation and
design of government housing programs of a coherent set of justiﬁcations
for programs of this type. However, the following properties seem broadly
consistent with the preceding justiﬁcations. First, the program must induce
the worst-housed families at each income level to occupy better housing
than they would choose if they were given equally costly cash grants with
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two major housing acts, namely “to remedy the acute shortage of decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings” (Housing Act of 1937) and “the elimination
of substandard and other inadequate housing” (Housing Act of 1949).1
Second, families that are the same with respect to characteristics of inter-
est to taxpayers should be oﬀered the same assistance. Third, the greatest
assistance should go to the neediest families. Finally, the housing provided
to participants should have the lowest possible total cost to tenants and
governments given its overall desirability.
Other goals for housing programs have been suggested, for example, in-
creasing homeownership, reducing racial segregation in housing, or stabi-
lizing new construction. The rationales for achieving these goals are diﬀer-
ent from those underlying housing subsidies to low-income families, and
they are arguably best achieved by other means.
6.2.2 History
Table 6.1 contains some milestones in the development of the system of
housing subsidies for low-income households in the United States.2 This
subsection provides a brief overview of the development of each part of the
system, namely public housing, privately owned projects, tenant-based
certiﬁcates and vouchers, homeownership programs, and housing block
grants. The next subsection provides details about the rules governing the
four largest rental programs.
Public Housing
Substantial government involvement in subsidizing the housing of low-
income households began with the Public Housing Program enacted in the
U.S. Housing Act of 1937. Public housing projects are owned and operated
by local public housing authorities established by local governments. Al-
most all are newly built for the program. Until 1969, with minor excep-
tions, federal taxpayers paid the initial development cost of public housing
and tenants and local taxpayers paid the operating cost. Between 1968 and
1972, the federal government greatly increased its previously modest sub-
sidies for operating public housing projects in conjunction with restric-
tions on the rents that local housing authorities could charge their tenants.
In 1969, the federal government began to provide subsidies to local hous-
ing authorities for the modernization of their projects. These additional
subsidies and restrictions on rent were intended to insure that public hous-
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1. In discussions of housing policy, the word “shortage” is not used as economists use it. In-
stead it means that the market outcome does not provide all households with the type of hous-
ing that the speaker thinks they should occupy. All major HUD programs were enacted in
these laws or as amendments to them.
2. The dates listed in the table are the dates that programs were enacted. Programs do not
become operational until regulations have been written, and this sometimes requires consid-
erable time.ing would provide satisfactory housing to its tenants without charging
rents that were regarded as excessive.
Privately Owned Projects
In 1954, the federal government began to contract with private parties to
provide housing for low-income households. Under most programs, these
parties agreed to provide housing meeting certain standards to households
with particular characteristics for a speciﬁed number of years. The over-
whelming majority of the projects were newly built. Almost all of the rest
were substantially rehabilitated as a condition for participation in the pro-
gram. The federal government insures the mortgages on the vast majority
of these projects, and default loss in excess of mortgage insurance pay-
ments is a major indirect cost of many of the programs. It is important to
realize that none of these programs provide subsidies to all suppliers who
would like to participate. Since subsidies are provided to selected private
suppliers, the market mechanism does not insure that subsidies are passed
along to occupants of the subsidized units. In all cases, civil servants are in-
volved in ranking proposals. In most programs, political appointees make
the ﬁnal decisions.
The earlier programs such as HUD’s Section 221(d)(3) Market Interest
Rate Program and Section 202 limited the private parties who operate the
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Table 6.1 Development of System of Housing Programs
New Programs and Major Modiﬁcations of Existing Programs
1937 Public housing, HUD, rental, publicly owned
1949 Section 502, USDA, homeownership
1954 Section 221(d)(3) MIR, HUD, rental, privately owned
1959 Section 202, HUD, rental, privately owned, elderly and handicapped
1961 Section 221(d)(3) BMIR, HUD, rental, privately owned
1962 Section 515, USDA, rental, privately owned
1965 Rent supplements, HUD, rental, extra subsidy to private projects
1965 Section 23, HUD, rental, leasing existing units for public housing tenants
1968 Section 235, HUD, homeownership
1968 Section 236, HUD, rental, privately owned
1969 Modernization subsidies for public housing
1969 Rents in public housing limited to 25 percent of income
1970 Substantial operating subsidies for public housing
1974 Section 8 Existing, HUD, rental, tenant-based
1974 Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation, HUD, rental, privately 
owned
1975 Operating subsidies for public housing (Performance Funding System)
1976 Operating subsidies for privately-owned projects (LMSA and PD)
1979 Modernization subsidies for privately owned projects (Flexible Subsidy)
1983 Housing Voucher Demonstration, HUD, rental, tenant-based
1986 LIHTC, IRS, rental, privately owned
1990 HOME, HUD, rental and homeownership, block grants to states and localities
1998 Housing Choice Voucher Program, HUD, rental, tenant-basedprojects to nonproﬁts and cooperatives.3 They were succeeded by pro-
grams that allowed the participation of for-proﬁt ﬁrms, while attempting
to limit their proﬁts by restricting their net revenues during the period of
the use agreement. For-proﬁt ﬁrms have accounted for the majority of the
units in the most recent programs such as Section 8 New Construction/
Substantial Rehabilitation and the LIHTC. Despite this trend, nonproﬁts
still account for a substantial minority of units under some recent pro-
grams such as the LIHTC.4
The earlier programs (Section 221[d][3] MIR and Section 202) did not
have income limits. Instead they attempted to insure occupancy by house-
holds of low and moderate income by limiting the per-unit cost of the proj-
ect, thereby providing relatively modest housing. The subsidy under the
earlier programs was a below-market interest rate on the loan used to ﬁ-
nance the project, and the subsidy received by an occupant of the project
did not depend on the household’s income. The modest magnitude of the
subsidy and the high cost of newly built housing meeting the program’s
standards resulted in few units occupied by the poorest households.
The initial response to this situation (HUD’s Section 221[d][3] BMIR
Program) was to provide a larger interest subsidy, thereby reducing the rent
to tenants at all income levels by the same amount. Another response (for
example, the Rent Supplement Program) was to provide an additional sub-
sidy to many of the poorest households in projects that received an interest
subsidy in order to reduce their rents to 25 percent of their adjusted in-
comes. (The poorest of the poor paid a ﬂat rent equal to 30 percent of the
rent that would otherwise be charged for the apartment.) Rent supple-
ments were used almost exclusively with the Section 221(d)(3) MIR and the
Section 236 programs.
The basic HUD Section 236 program and the USDA’s 515 program are
similar to the Section 221(d)(3) BMIR program in providing a substantial
interest subsidy that reduces the rent of all of the poorest households oc-
cupying identical apartments in a project by the same amount. The more
aﬄuent among the eligibles initially paid 25 percent of their adjusted in-
comes. Over time, an increasing fraction of the poorest occupants of these
projects have received additional subsidies under a succession of programs
that initially reduced their rents to 25 percent of adjusted income and later
to 30 percent.5 Some of these programs were intended to insure that proj-
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3. The original Section 221(d)(3) program is usually called the Market Interest Rate Pro-
gram (MIR). This is misleading because the program does provide ﬁnancing at below-market
interest rates, albeit not as far below market as the later Section 221(d)(3) Below-Market In-
terest Rate (BMIR) Program.
4. The extent of the involvement of the two types of sponsor is not well documented because
they often work in partnership and only one is listed as the sponsor in oﬃcial records.
5. The programs involved were the Rent Supplement Program, the Rental Assistance Pay-
ments Program, Section 8 Conversion Assistance, and the Section 8 Loan Management Set-
Aside (LMSA) and Property Disposition (PD) Programs.ects built under construction programs continued to house low-income
households and to avoid defaults on loans insured by the federal govern-
ment. However, about a fourth of the occupants of apartments in privately
owned HUD-subsidized projects have rents that do not vary with their in-
come (HUD 1997, 3).
In 1978, Congress enacted the Flexible Subsidy Program to provide
modernization subsidies to older privately owned subsidized projects, es-
pecially under Section 236, 221(d)(3), and 202, just as it had done earlier
for public housing. The money is awarded on a competitive basis rather
than by formula.
The largest program of subsidized privately owned projects for low-
income households is HUD’s Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Re-
habilitation Program, enacted in 1974. Section 8 New Construction/Sub-
stantial Rehabilitation provides not only subsidies for the construction or
rehabilitation of projects but also rental assistance payments that initially
reduced the rents paid by all tenants to 25 percent of their adjusted in-
comes.6
With minor exceptions, Congress had terminated all of HUD’s con-
struction programs by 1983. Section 236 replaced Section 221(d)(3)
BMIR, Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation replaced
Section 236, and Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation
was terminated in 1983 in the sense that no additional applications for
projects under this program were accepted after this time.7 This was in re-
sponse to the large per-unit cost under all new construction programs com-
pared with tenant-based Section 8 Certiﬁcates and studies indicating that
these costs were also large relative to the market rents of the units provided.
Only public housing and the small Section 202 program for the elderly and
handicapped, which had been revised to operate like the Section 8 New
Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program, were allowed to ap-
prove a modest number of additional applications.
The LIHTC was enacted hastily as a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
to replace other tax subsidies for low-income housing that were elimi-
nated.8 Within a few years, it will become the second largest program of
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6. Beginning on 1 August 1982, it increased periodically until it reached 30 on 1 October
1985.
7. It is a testimony to the long lags between the appropriation of money under construction
programs and their completion that the number of occupied units under this program con-
tinued to grow for thirteen years after its termination. For systematic evidence on these lags,
see Schnare et al. (1982, table 4-8).
8. Virtually nothing is known about the eﬀects of the LIHTC. There is no repository of in-
formation on the characteristics of the households served by this program or the characteris-
tics of the housing provided. Some rudimentary statistical information can be found at http:/
/www.huduser.org/datasets/lihtc.html. What is known about the program is the result of a few
studies. Wallace (1995, 794–801) provides an accurate description of the program’s rules and
a summary of basic descriptive statistics that had been produced by earlier studies. Cum-
mings and DiPasquale (1999) add an unusually thorough analysis of all of the subsidies pro-housing subsidies to low-income households, surpassing public housing.
For projects not ﬁnanced by tax-exempt bonds, the tax credit pays 70 per-
cent of the cost of developing the project. The tax credit is not available to
all developers who want to build housing under the terms speciﬁed in the
law. Instead each state housing ﬁnance agency is allocated an amount of
money that is proportional to the state’s population to distribute to se-
lected private suppliers. In recent years, developers have proposed projects
that would use three times the amount of money appropriated for the pro-
gram, and many do not apply because the probability of success is too
small to justify the eﬀort.
The overwhelming majority of tax credit projects receive subsidies from
other sources, primarily development grants or loans at below-market in-
terest rates from state and local governments and rental assistance pay-
ments that depend upon the income of the tenants. These additional de-
velopment subsidies account for about a third of the total capital subsidy
(Cummings and DiPasquale 1999, table 7), and owners of tax credit prop-
erties receive rental assistance payments on behalf of about 39 percent of
their tenants (GAO 1997, 40). The typical project receives subsidized ﬁ-
nancing from many sources, thereby complicating the task of insuring that
the subsidy is passed along to the tenant. The median was ﬁve in Stegman’s
nonrandom sample of twenty-four projects (Stegman 1991, 362).
Under the LIHTC, the tenant’s maximum rent is 30 percent of the upper
income limit for eligibility.9Tenant rent within a project does not vary with
income except for households who receive assistance from other programs
that require it. As a result, the poorest households occupy relatively few LI-
HTC units. According to Wallace (1995, 790), only 28 percent of house-
holds in LIHTC projects are very low-income as HUD deﬁnes this term (50
percent of local median for a family of four). The percentages are 90 for
Section 8 New Construction, 81 for public housing, and 77 for Section 236
and 221(d)(3) BMIR.
Tenant-Based Assistance
Until 1965, all housing assistance to the poor was project based and the
overwhelming majority of units were newly constructed under a govern-
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vided for the development of LIHTC projects. This analysis does not, however, include the
substantial tenant-based and project-based Section 8 subsidies received by about 39 percent
of the units (GAO 1997, 40). GAO (1997) and Buron et al. (2000) provide additional descrip-
tive material. Despite the absence of evidence on the eﬀects of the LIHTC, Congress in 2000–
01 increased tax expenditure for this program by more than 40 percent to about $5 billion per
year and indexed appropriations to inﬂation. Shortly thereafter, GAO (2002) produced the
ﬁrst independent analysis of the cost-eﬀectiveness of the program.
9. The upper income limit for a family of four is eﬀectively 60 percent of the local median.
Increasing or decreasing these income limits by nationally uniform percentages used for the
largest HUD programs yields the income limits for households of other sizes.ment program. In 1965 Congress created Section 23, a program under
which public housing authorities could lease apartments in existing private
unsubsidized housing for the use of households eligible for public hous-
ing.10 One variant of this program allowed tenants to locate their own
apartments meeting the program’s minimum standards. This was the ﬁrst
program of tenant-based assistance in the United States. In 1974, the Sec-
tion 8 Existing Housing Program replaced Section 23. Since then, tenant-
based Section 8 has become the country’s largest program of housing
assistance. This program was called the Certiﬁcate Program. Another
program of tenant-based housing assistance, called the Section 8 Voucher
Program, that had somewhat diﬀerent constraints than the Certiﬁcate Pro-
gram was introduced in 1983. This program operated simultaneously with
the Certiﬁcate Program until 1998, when the two programs were consoli-
dated into another tenant-based program that combined features of the
two earlier programs.
Despite the rapid growth of the tenant-based Section 8 Certiﬁcate and
Voucher programs, the majority of additional recipients of rental housing
assistance since 1975 have received project-based assistance. Between 1975
and 1990, the major sources of this assistance were Section 8 New Con-
struction/Substantial Rehabilitation and Section 515. Since 1990, the over-
whelming majority of HUD’s incremental assistance has been tenant
based, but project-based assistance has continued to account for the ma-
jority of additions to number of subsidized households in the United States
due to the rapid growth of the Internal Revenue Service’s LIHTC. Fur-
thermore, HUD spends a substantial fraction of its budget providing ad-
ditional assistance to units in subsidized housing projects beyond the sub-
sidies initially promised.
Homeownership Programs
The United States has had two major homeownership programs that
provide housing assistance to low-income households. The Housing Act of
1949 established the USDA’s Section 502 Single Family Direct Loan Pro-
gram.11 Until 1968, the magnitude of the subsidy was modest and did not
depend on the household’s income. The subsidy consisted of lending at the
federal borrowing rate to farmers and others living in rural areas. (Farm-
ers now account for a small share of all borrowers.) The Housing Act of
1968 authorized the USDA to pay a portion of the loan repayments for
low-income households. For the poorest households, the USDA paid the
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10. For a comprehensive analysis of this program and a detailed survey of the literature on
it, see Reid (1989).
11. See Carliner (1998, 314–15) for a brief history of the development of the program and
Mikesell et al. (1999) for descriptive statistics and the ﬁrst analysis of this program based on
a nationally representative survey.diﬀerence between principal and interest payments at the government’s
borrowing rate and at an interest rate of 1 percent. For eligible households
with higher incomes, the USDA paid the diﬀerence between property
taxes, homeowners insurance, operating expenses, and principal and in-
terest payments at the government’s borrowing rate and 20 percent of the
household’s adjusted income. During its ﬁfty-year history, the Section 502
Single Family Direct Loan Program has provided over $51 billion in home-
ownership loans to about 1.9 million households. The program currently
provides subsidies to over 500,000 low-income households.
The Housing Act of 1968 established Section 235, a HUD program sim-
ilar in many respects to USDA’s Section 502. Unlike Section 502, this pro-
gram suﬀered from scandals and high default rates (Carliner 1998, 313–
14). Section 235 was suspended in 1973, reactivated in 1975, severely lim-
ited in geographical scope in 1983, and terminated in 1987. Over this pe-
riod, it provided subsidies to more 500,000 low-income households. Little
is known about the reasons for the diﬀerence in outcomes of the two pro-
grams. The poor performance of Section 235 is usually attributed to con-
sumer naivete and Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mismanage-
ment. More plausible explanations would rely on diﬀerences in the
structures of the programs such as the magnitude of the down payment re-
quired and whether the subsidy is allocated to the seller or the buyer of the
house.
Housing Block Grants
The HOME Investment Partnerships Program enacted in 1990 is a block
grant for housing assistance. It allocates federal funds by formula to state
and local governments to spend on any type of housing assistance subject
to certain limits on the incomes of the households served, the cost to ac-
quire and develop units, and the rents that may be charged for rental units.
This program is based on the untested assumptions that the best mix of
housing programs diﬀers from locality to locality and local oﬃcials are
better able to determine and implement the best mix.12
6.2.3 Rules
This section presents information concerning many of the important
rules governing HUD’s four largest programs of rental housing assistance
for low-income households and the evolution of these rules over the history
of the programs. The rules considered determine who is eligible to receive
assistance, how the limited assistance is allocated among households that
would like to participate, upper and lower limits on the desirability of the
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12. These assumptions could be tested by comparing the outcomes of diﬀerent federal pro-
grams across localities to see whether one program performs better than all others on all mea-
sures and then comparing the overall eﬀect of the mix of programs chosen by local oﬃcials
with the federal mix in a random sample of localities.housing that can be occupied, and upper limits on spending on goods other
than housing. These rules aﬀect which households are served and a pro-
gram’s eﬀects on consumption patterns.
Other rules that determine the incentives facing potential and actual
suppliers will not be discussed. For construction and rehabilitation pro-
grams, these rules aﬀect the types of housing that will be proposed and se-
lected. For all programs, they aﬀect how well the units will be maintained
and the total cost of the housing provided. Although these rules determine
the cost-eﬀectiveness of a program and the level of housing services pro-
vided, they have not been seriously analyzed by housing policy analysts.
This represents a major gap in our knowledge of housing programs.
It is not possible within reasonable time and space constraints to de-
scribe accurately the rules of the four programs that are the focus of this pa-
per over their histories. The rule describing what is and is not included in a
household’s annual income in determining its eligibility for assistance il-
lustrates the problem. The current rule is more than three pages single
spaced. This rule is now the same for all major low-income housing pro-
grams. In earlier years, it was diﬀerent for diﬀerent programs, and it has
been changed on a number of occasions over the history of each program.
Researchers who want to conduct empirical studies of the eﬀects of
housing programs, or indeed any program, should consult the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) for the time period to which their data refer to
determine the rules that were in eﬀect at that time.13 The regulations for
HUD are in Title 24 of the CFR. That is, references to them all begin with
24CFR. For example, since 1996 the reference for HUD’s physical condi-
tion standards for virtually all subsidized housing has been 24CFR5.703.
In earlier years, the standards for each program were located in the CFR
under the regulations for that program.
The CFR is an annual publication that contains the updated regulations
of the federal government as of April 1. A searchable electronic version
containing the CFR and the Federal Register since 1981 is available at
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/. Virtually all rules of interest must
be published in the Federal Register along with the date on which they be-
came eﬀective, and each regulation in the CFR cites the relevant passage
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13. In the case of housing programs, secondary sources, even government publications or
agency websites, are always incomplete and sometimes erroneous. For example, it is often said
in oﬃcial HUD documents that the upper income limit for admission to public housing is 80
percent of the local median. This might lead the unsuspecting to conclude that the income
limit is the same for families of all sizes, or perhaps that for families of each size it is 80 per-
cent of the local median for families of that size. Neither is correct. Reading the legislation is
not a substitute for reading the regulations. Legislation typically speciﬁes some, but not all,
of a program’s rules. It provides general guidelines concerning other matters, but leaves the
design of speciﬁc regulations to the administering agency. Furthermore, the operation of a
program does not change with the passage of legislation. This does not occur until after new
regulations have been announced in the Federal Register.in the Federal Register. For example, the citation for the proposed regula-
tion that ultimately led to a uniﬁed set of physical condition standards ap-
plying to all low-income housing programs is 63FR35650. As usual, this
source contained a history of previous regulations. The citation for the ﬁ-
nal rule is 63FR46566, which contains the date on which the regulation be-
came eﬀective.
These sources are useful not only for researchers who have a data set that
identiﬁes which households participate in housing programs and are at-
tempting to determine the parameters of the budget spaces of these house-
holds but also to others who are trying to learn when major changes in pro-
gram parameters occurred with an eye to selecting which data to use to
maximize exogenous variation in budget constraint parameters. Using
these sources, it is easy to determine when important changes in the regu-
lations have occurred.
Prior to the regulations implementing the Housing and Community De-
velopment Act of 1974, there was considerable diversity in the rules of
diﬀerent housing programs. This legislation introduced many similarities
in the rules across programs, and this trend has continued over the past
twenty-ﬁve years, culminating in the 1990s with the placement of many
common rules in Part 5 of Title 24 of the CFR. These include rules for pref-
erences for admission into subsidized housing (24CFR5.4XY since 1996),
income limits, the deﬁnitions of annual income and adjusted income, ten-
ant rents, and certifying eligibility (24CFR5.6XY since 1997), and mini-
mum physical housing standards (24CFR5.7XY since 1999).
To help aspiring housing policy analysts navigate through the regula-
tions and to provide others with an overview of the rules that have gov-
erned low-income housing programs, this section describes the key rules
that prevailed on 1 April 1999 and some of the major changes that have oc-
curred in these rules over the years.
Before proceeding, it is useful to mention several general features of the
rules. In recent years, the majority of privately owned projects under
HUD’s programs receive project-based Section 8 housing assistance pay-
ments and are therefore subject to the key rules of the Section 8 program.
Since the enactment of the Section 8 program in 1974, Section 8 and public
housing have had very similar rules in many respects. This means that the
overwhelming majority of HUD’s subsidized households are subject to
many of the same rules.
Eligibility
With a few minor exceptions such as Section 221(d)(3) MIR and Section
202 in its early years, all housing programs have had upper income limits
for eligibility. Indeed, the earlier programs such as public housing had two
limits for households of each size—one for initial receipt of a subsidy and
378 Edgar O. Olsena larger limit for retaining the subsidy.14 The income limits that are dis-
cussed here and elsewhere are limits for initial receipt of a subsidy unless
otherwise stated.
Prior to the 1974 Housing Act, local public housing authorities chose
their own upper income limits based on a vaguely worded provision of the
law. The upper income limits for other programs were related to the limits
for public housing and always greater than these limits. For example, the
income limits for Section 236 in its early years were 35 percent above the
limits for public housing in the same locality.
Since the 1974 Housing Act, public housing, Section 236, and all vari-
ants of Section 8 have had a common set of income limits. These programs
account for the overwhelming majority of HUD-subsidized households.
Each year, the Economic and Market Analysis Division (EMAD) in
HUD’s Oﬃce of Policy Development and Research estimates these limits
in accordance with the regulations.
The basic income limit for a family of four is 80 percent of the median
income of all families in a locality.15Income limits for families of other sizes
are obtained from the four-person income limit by applying the following
percentages.16
Family Size and Percentage Adjustments
12 34 5678
70% 80% 90% 100% 108% 116% 124% 132%
In the terminology of housing regulations and policy discussions, these
families are described as low-income families.17 In the absence of excep-
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14. The earliest housing programs involved construction and so households had to move in
order to receive the subsidy. Even after these programs stopped producing additional units,
households entering the program had to move into a project in order to receive a subsidy. The
higher limit for continued occupancy was introduced to avoid forcing a household to move if
its income rose too much. This problem only arises if the market rent of the unit occupied ex-
ceeds the tenant’s rent at the upper income limit for admission, that is, if there is a notch at
this upper income limit. This is almost surely the case for every construction program in its
early years when the housing is new. Based on a vague provision in the law, many local hous-
ing authorities set their upper income limits for continued occupancy 25 percent above their
limits for admission. Public housing has not had a separate upper income limit for continued
occupancy for many years. If a public housing tenant’s income rises above the income limit
for admission, the housing authority could force the tenant to leave the project, but this rarely
happens. Under Section 8 certiﬁcates and vouchers, the eﬀective upper income limit for con-
tinued receipt of a subsidy is the income at which the subsidy is zero.
15. Income limits were related to local median incomes in an attempt to account for geo-
graphical price diﬀerences, but diﬀerences in median incomes obviously also reﬂect other fac-
tors such as diﬀerences in skill levels.
16. There is no good rationale for these percentages. For example, they are not based on
diﬀerences in poverty lines for households of diﬀerent sizes.
17. To put these limits in perspective, the poverty line is about 30 percent of median income.tions, only low-income families are eligible for the housing programs that
account for almost all means-tested housing subsidies.
However, there are important exceptions to these simple rules. In 2000,
these aﬀected the limits for 37 percent of the metropolitan areas and 86
percent of the non-metropolitan areas. The most important exception in
terms of the number of areas aﬀected is the requirement that the income
limits in a nonmetropolitan area may not be less than limits based on the
state nonmetropolitan median family income.
In a series of amendments to housing laws since 1975, Congress has
speciﬁed that an increasing percentage of recipients of housing subsidies
have incomes below 50 percent of the local median for four-person fami-
lies and the aforementioned adjustments for family size.18 These house-
holds are called very low-income households, and these laws are codiﬁed in
24CFR1275 (1975), 24CFR882 (1976), 24CFR813 (1985), and 24CFR982
(1999).
Finally, the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 cre-
ated a new category called extremely low-income families, whose incomes
were 30 percent of the local median for families of four and required a high
percentage of new recipients of housing subsidies to be in this category
(24CFR982.201 [2000]). Consistent with a trend over several decades to
avoid concentrations of the poorest households in public housing, the re-
quired percentage was much lower for public housing than tenant-based
vouchers and certiﬁcates. Speciﬁcally, the act required that at least 75 per-
cent of new recipients of tenant-based vouchers and only 40 percent of new
recipients of HUD’s project-based assistance have extremely low incomes.
The details concerning the rules and methods for calculating income
limits are contained in ﬁscal year (FY) 2000 Income Limits Brieﬁng Mate-
rial available at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/il.html. Fortunately, un-
derstanding these complexities is not important for most purposes because
the income limits themselves are available in electronic form for all areas
from 1990 to the present at the aforementioned website. They can be ob-
tained for earlier years through HUD’s Economic Market Analysis Divi-
sion (EMAD).
Unlike many other means-tested welfare programs, there are no asset
tests for eligibility for housing assistance. Actual or imputed income from
speciﬁed assets is included in income in determining eligibility and rent.
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18. The income limits calculated based on 80 percent of the local median and income lim-
its for virtually all other housing programs, including non-HUD programs, that use diﬀerent
percentages are calculated by ﬁrst calculating the limits based on 50 percent, then applying
the exceptions, and ﬁnally multiplying by the relevant percentage. For example, almost all LI-
HTC projects involve a program option that restricts the rents of tenants to income limits
based on 60 percent of the local median. To calculate these limits, the limits based on 50 per-
cent are multiplied by 1.2.Preferences
Since housing programs are not entitlements, some system is required to
allocate the available money to the many families that would like to partic-
ipate.19 The most salient feature of the system is that there has never been
a uniform national system to rank families on a waiting list. Instead Con-
gress has speciﬁed that some preference must be given to certain types of
families but left it to local housing authorities and owners of subsidized
private projects to devise preference schemes. For example, in 1971 Section
10(g)(2) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 read as follows:
The public housing agency shall adopt and promulgate regulations es-
tablishing admissions policies which shall give full consideration to its
responsibility for the rehousing of displaced families, to the applicant’s
status as a serviceman or veteran or relationship to a serviceman or vet-
eran . . . , and to the applicant’s age or disability, housing conditions, ur-
gency of housing need, and source of income: Provided, That in estab-
lishing such admission policies the public housing agency shall accord to
families of low income such priority over single persons as it determines
to be necessary to avoid undue hardship.
HUD has never been authorized to establish a nationally uniform prefer-
ence system. Its role has been to review preference systems for consistency
with congressional intent.
Obviously, there are inﬁnitely many schemes for ranking families on a
waiting list that give some preference to the types of households mentioned
in this passage. There are now about 3,400 local public housing authorities
and more than 22,000 privately owned HUD-subsidized projects. Al-
though some undoubtedly copy the schemes of others, it seems likely that
there have always been an enormous number of diﬀerent schemes in exis-
tence. A common scheme has been to assign points to diﬀerent family at-
tributes mentioned in the law. However, there are inﬁnitely many diﬀerent
weights that could be assigned to the favored household types consistent
with the wording of the law.20
Although the language of the law with respect to priorities for receipt of
housing subsidies has changed from time to time and other types of fami-
lies have been singled out for preferential treatment, some of the family
types mentioned in the preceding passage have been accorded preferential
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19. The next section discusses the extent of the excess demand for assistance to the extent
possible with existing data.
20. This creates a problem for research where information on the preference scheme is im-
portant. These preference systems could be collected because each public housing agency and
manager of a privately owned project is required by law to have a written preference scheme
that is available to the public. However, it would be quite expensive to do it for all subsidized
housing because they are not available in HUD’s central oﬃce.treatment for receipt of housing assistance under many programs over
much of their histories. The elderly and handicapped have been given a
preference for subsidized housing for at least forty years. There are two
programs (Section 202 and 811) limited to such households, many projects
built under other programs are built exclusively for them, and they have
typically been given priority for admission into projects not built exclu-
sively for them. Families living in substandard housing or displaced by
government action have always been given a preference for housing subsi-
dies.21 Single persons who are not elderly, disabled, or displaced by gov-
ernment action have always been given a low priority for assistance.
Congress suspended federal preferences on 26 January 1996 and re-
pealed them in the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998
(64FR23460, 65FR16692). The ﬁnal regulations implementing these
changes became eﬀective 30 April 2000. Since these legislative changes did
not require housing authorities to alter their current preference system, it
is likely that they had little immediate eﬀect. Immediately prior to the sus-
pension of federal preferences, federal law required that for the over-
whelming majority of new recipients of housing assistance, local housing
authorities must give preference to families who were occupying substan-
dard housing, involuntarily displaced, or paying more than 50 percent of
income for rent. They were allowed to use local preferences for a small mi-
nority of new recipients (53FR1122).
Restrictions on Housing Consumption
Under all forms of project-based housing assistance, households that
reach the top of the waiting list are oﬀered a particular unit. To a ﬁrst ap-
proximation, they have no choice concerning the quantity of housing ser-
vices that they consume if they want to receive housing assistance. It is only
to the extent that they can reject particular units without dropping to the
bottom of the waiting list and the possibility of being simultaneously on
the waiting lists for public housing and individual private projects that eli-
gible families have a range of housing choices.22Even if we ignore the com-
plexities resulting from these possibilities, it is not the case that all house-
holds oﬀered assistance under a project-based program are oﬀered the
same housing. Under mature construction and substantial rehabilitation
programs, the variance in the desirability of the program’s units of a par-
ticular size is enormous. Therefore, the housing oﬀered by these programs
at a point in time cannot be characterized by a single number such as its
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21. Many involved in discussions of housing policy view living in substandard housing as
something that happens to a person rather than something that is chosen.
22. Some housing authorities allow tenants to reject a few units before being dropped from
the waiting list. Nothing prevents eligible households from being on the public housing wait-
ing list and simultaneously applying for an apartment in any privately owned subsidized
project.market rent divided by a housing price index or a single vector of charac-
teristics. As explained later and depicted in ﬁgure 6.4, families eligible for
tenant-based housing vouchers or certiﬁcates have a wide range of housing
choices, but the program adds the same consumption bundles to the bud-
get spaces of all eligible families with the same characteristics living in one
locality provided that they are oﬀered assistance.
Since a primary goal of housing programs is to improve the housing oc-
cupied by participants, it should not be surprising that almost all housing
programs have minimum housing standards. For some programs such as
the older programs involving privately owned projects, these standards
have been so vague as to be unenforceable. They require that the housing
be decent, safe, and sanitary. For others such as tenant-based vouchers and
certiﬁcates, much more speciﬁc standards have existed.23 It was not until
1999 that the same detailed standards applied to virtually all subsidized
housing (63FR46566).
With the exception of the housing voucher program that began as a
demonstration in 1983 and is currently being phased out, all housing pro-
grams place upper limits on the quantity of housing available to partici-
pants. In the case of production programs, these result from upper limits
on construction costs and limits on the amount of money that the housing
authority or owner of a private project can receive from the tenant and the
government each month. Although this limits how good any program unit
can be, it is not a parameter of the budget space of most households oﬀered
units under the program. Due to depreciation, units under mature produc-
tion programs diﬀer widely in their condition. A household’s budget space
depends on which unit it is oﬀered. With the exception of the aforemen-
tioned voucher program, the other programs of tenant-based assistance
impose upper limits on the rents that landlords can receive. This upper
limit is a parameter of the budget space of each household oﬀered assis-
tance under a particular program in a speciﬁc locality.
Under all housing programs, the size of the apartment oﬀered to a house-
hold depends on the size and composition of the household. For example,
two children of the same sex will be expected to share a bedroom. Beyond a
certain age, two children of diﬀerent sexes will have their own bedrooms.
Tenant Rent
For more than thirty years, the tenant’s contribution to rent under all
construction programs has been speciﬁed in the program’s regulations. For
all units in the largest programs (public housing and Section 8 New Con-
struction/Substantial Rehabilitation) and many units in other programs, it
has depended on household characteristics, but not on the desirability of
the housing occupied. Similar remarks apply to the Section 8 Certiﬁcate
Housing Programs for Low-Income Households 383
23. See 63FR35650 for a history of the occupancy standards.Program since 1980. For the other programs of tenant-based assistance,
the tenant’s contribution to rent depends on the market rent of the apart-
ment selected.
In public housing prior to 1969, each local housing authority had its
own system for determining the rent paid by public housing tenants sub-
ject to very general guidelines. Some housing authorities charged a ﬁxed
fraction of adjusted income (usually 20 percent), others charged the same
rents for all apartments of the same size, and still others charged a certain
minimum rent to the poorest households and a fraction of adjusted income
to households for which this was larger. In 1969, legislation imposed a uni-
form upper limit on rents at 25 percent of adjusted income, and almost all
local authorities charged the maximum rents permitted. Between 1982 and
1985, a transition to a higher percentage—30 percent—occurred, and the
authorities were required to charge this rent. The Section 8 New Con-
struction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program and the Section 8 Certiﬁcate
Program after 1980 used the 25 percent rule initially and made the afore-
mentioned transition to 30 percent in the early 1980s.
The history of the rules for tenant rent in the Section 236 program is sim-
ilar to the history in several other construction programs. The thick lines in
ﬁgure 6.1 depict how the tenant’s rent TR under Section 236 without rent
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Fig. 6.1 Tenant rent under section 236 without rent supplementssupplements or other additional subsidies varies with the tenant’s income
Y. In the diagrams, FMR is the sum of the allowed monthly costs of pro-
viding an apartment, including repayment of the mortgage loan at the in-
terest rate charged by the lender.24 HUD directly pays enough of the mort-
gage payment to reduce the eﬀective interest rate to one percent. This
determines the basic rent BR paid by the poorest participants. Richer par-
ticipants paid 25 percent of their adjusted incomes, and owners rebated to
HUD the excess of this amount over BR. If the upper income limit for eli-
gibility YLIM is suﬃciently high that 25 percent of the adjusted incomes
of some tenants exceeds FMR (as in ﬁgure 6.1), their rent is FMR.
The thick lines in ﬁgure 6.2 depict how the tenant’s rent varies with in-
come for Section 236 with rent supplements. The Rent Supplement Pro-
gram was an attempt to make it more attractive for the poorest households
to occupy units in these projects and for the owners of the projects to ac-
cept these tenants by guaranteeing a part of the rent payment.25To achieve
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24. This interest rate is below the market rate due to indirect interest subsidies. For this and
other reasons, FMR should not be interpreted as the market rent of the unit.
25. The Rent Supplement Program enacted in 1965 was always used in conjunction with
subsidized construction programs involving private ownership of housing projects, especially
Section 236 and Section 221(d)(3) MIR. Piggybacks with other construction programs were
Fig. 6.2 Tenant rent under section 236 with rent supplementsthis goal, the program paid a portion of the rent that the poorest house-
holds would otherwise have to pay to live in these projects. Speciﬁcally,
these extra payments reduced tenant rents to 25 percent of adjusted in-
come except when this was less than 0.3 BR. In that event, the tenant paid
0.3 BR. The minimum rent supplement payment was 0.1 BR. A succes-
sion of later programs replaced the Rent Supplement Program in provid-
ing additional subsidies to the poorest households in privately owned sub-
sidized projects.
6.3 Program Statistics
Table 6.2 contains the standard information on the number of house-
holds assisted by each broad type of housing program. In some respects,
these numbers are misleading.
First, the numbers concerning assisted homeowners are not comparable
to the numbers for rental assistance. When the loan on a unit subsidized
under a means-tested homeownership program is repaid that household is
no longer counted as being assisted even though it continues to live in the
house. That is one reason why the number of homeowners assisted has
declined. This contrasts sharply with rental assistance where households
living in housing built under new construction programs are counted inde-
pendent of whether the mortgage has been repaid as long as these house-
holds continue to receive a subsidy. In fact, the purchase of more than 2.5
million houses has been subsidized under Section 235, Section 502, and
other smaller programs.
Second, the numbers in table 6.2 reﬂect only households assisted by
HUD and USDA. They take no account of the large number of households
assisted by the LIHTC. About 700,000 households lived in such units in
1998 (table 6.5). Further, these numbers do not account for households
that receive subsidies from only state and local programs.
With these caveats in mind, we see that in percentage terms the fastest-
growing part of the system of rental housing subsidies over this period has
been household-based assistance to live in existing units. Recall, however,
that there were no programs in this category prior to 1965 when the small
precursor to the Section 8 Existing Housing Program was established. In
total, more additional households have been served over the past twenty
years by new construction programs than by household-based certiﬁcates
and vouchers even when the LIHTC is ignored.
Table 6.3 contains the standard numbers on HUD outlays. It shows that,
contrary to newspaper accounts, real expenditure on housing assistance
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rare. Except for providing supplements for projects in the pipeline at the time, no new com-
mitments under this program have been made since 5 January 1973. At its peak, the program




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.has more than tripled over the past twenty years, and table 6.4 shows that
real expenditure per household has increased more than 80 percent over
this period. With minor exceptions, both have increased continuously for
the last twenty years.
Although there is no good reason to believe that these numbers give an
erroneous view of the trends over time, it is important to realize that the
outlay for a particular year is not the total cost of providing HUD-
subsidized housing in that year, for several reasons. First, it does not in-
clude the many indirect subsidies involved, such as local property tax ex-
emptions and abatements received by all public housing projects and some
privately owned projects; the federal income tax exemption of interest on
the bonds issued by state and local governments to ﬁnance housing proj-
ects; and the underpriced mortgage insurance received by many privately
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Table 6.3 Outlays for Housing Aid Administered by HUD, 1977–97
Outlays





















1997 (estimate) 26,110a 26,110
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (1998, table 15-28).
Notes:The bulge in outlays in 1985 is caused by a change in the method of ﬁnancing housing,
which generated close to $14 billion in one-time expenditures. This amount paid oﬀ, all at
once, the capital cost of public housing construction and modernization activities undertaken
between 1974 and 1985, which otherwise would have been paid oﬀ over periods of up to forty
years. Because of this one-time expenditure, however, outlays for public housing since that
time have been lower than they would have been otherwise.
aFigures have been adjusted to account for $1.2 billion of advance spending that occurred in
1995 but that should have occurred in 1996.owned projects.26 Second, it includes outlays that are mainly used to pro-
vide housing in future years and excludes costs that are the result of past
outlays. For example, if HUD pays the cost of building a public housing
project this year, that outlay will appear this year. This enormously exceeds
the real cost of providing the public housing units for whatever part of the
current year they are available. It also greatly understates the cost of pro-
viding these units in all future years. That the development costs have been
paid does not mean that the cost of using the land and structure to house
low-income households is zero. These units have an opportunity cost. To
the extent that few units have been built recently or the units built have
been ﬁnanced with upfront capital grants rather than annual payments, the
real resource cost of HUD’s programs is understated. HUD has built few
Housing Programs for Low-Income Households 389
Table 6.4 Per-Unit Outlays for Housing Aid Administered by HUD, 1977–97
Per-Unit Outlays





















1997 (estimate) 5,490 5,490
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (1998, table 15-29).
Notes: The peak in outlays per unit in 1985 of $6,420 is attributable to the bulge in 1985 ex-
penditures associated with the change in the method for ﬁnancing public housing. Without
this change, outlays per unit would have amounted to around $2,860.
26. Mortgage insurance is underpriced when the present value of the losses exceeds the
present value of insurance premiums. Some programs are designed to provide a subsidy in this
form.units recently and has moved toward development grants and away from
partially or fully subsidizing mortgage payments. However, without
knowledge of the trend in the importance of indirect subsidies in the total
cost of providing housing assistance, it is impossible to say whether the
trends reported in tables 6.3 and 6.4 are understated or overstated.
Table 6.5 shows the number of units under the larger individual rental
programs. The decline in the number of public housing units in recent years
is due in part to the demolition of some projects, although most of the large
decline between October 1997 and October 1998 is due to the exclusion of
about 73,000 Indian public housing units from the total. It is a testimony
to the diﬃculty in producing information on the number of units receiving
various combinations of subsidies that this table indicates that only 38 per-
cent of Section 236 units received rent supplements or Section 8 project-
based assistance in 1997, whereas HUD’s Picture of Subsidized House-
holds indicates that 67 percent receive Section 8 project-based assistance.
The decline in the number of units under the Section 236 and Section 8 pro-
grams reﬂects in part the decisions of owners of some projects not to con-
tinue to participate at the termination of their contract with the govern-
ment.
Table 6.6 presents information about the characteristics of the house-
holds served by HUD’s four largest programs. Although household in-
come is about the same across the four programs, the substantial diﬀer-
ences in household sizes leads to substantial diﬀerences in per capita
income. Mean household sizes are 2.8 for tenant-based vouchers and cer-
tiﬁcates, 2.4 for public housing, 2.1 for Section 236, and 1.6 for Section 8
New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation. The latter program serves
the elderly and disabled to a much greater extent than the other programs.
Three-fourths of the households served by this program are in this cate-
gory, as opposed to about 45 percent in public housing and Section 236 and
only 34 percent with vouchers and certiﬁcates. Section 8 New Construc-
tion/Substantial Rehabilitation serves minorities to a much lesser extent
than the other programs. More than half of the households served by the
three other programs are members of a minority group, but only 37 percent
of households served by this program are minorities. Finally, public hous-
ing projects are much more often located in neighborhoods with a high
poverty rate and a high fraction of households that are minorities.
One of the most salient features of the system of housing subsidies is the
extent to which it fails to oﬀer assistance to all eligible households.27 Con-
sider the largest group that has been given priority for assistance by the
biggest housing programs. For many years, Congress has required that
public housing and Section 8 reserve a substantial majority of newly allo-
cated units for households whose incomes are less than limits based on 50
390 Edgar O. Olsen















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.percent of the local median income for four-person households, with na-
tionally uniform percentage adjustments for households of other sizes as
previously described. These households account for 27 percent of all house-
holds in the country. Only 28 percent of the renters in this income group re-
ceive housing assistance. Local housing agencies have been allowed to ad-
mit households into these programs with incomes up to 60 percent higher
than the limits based on 50 percent of the local median for almost twenty
years. Forty-two percent of all households meet these higher income limits,
and 23 percent of the renters in this larger group receive housing assistance.
Because participants whose income rises above the upper limits appli-
cable for admission into the program are rarely terminated, because ex-
ceptions to the limits are allowed in some cases, and because some pro-
grams have higher upper income limits, many households with higher
incomes receive housing subsidies under means-tested housing programs.
Speciﬁcally, 10 percent of all renters with incomes between limits based on
50 and 80 percent of the local median for four-person households and the
standard HUD adjustments for households of other sizes receive means-
tested housing assistance. Seven percent with incomes between limits
based on 80 and 120 percent of the local median and 7 percent with in-
comes in excess of limits based on 120 percent of the local median also re-
ceive means-tested housing assistance.
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Table 6.6 Characteristics of HUD-Subsidized Households 1997
Section 8 Section 8
Vouchers and Public New and Substantial Section
Certiﬁcates Housing Rehabilitation 236
Number of projects — 13,755 15,177 4,224
Subsidized people (thousands) 3,973 2,859 1,403 902
Subsidized units (thousands) 1,433 1,322 895 448
Average rent per month, inc. utilities 204 192 190 255
Average household income per year 9,100 8,900 8,900 10,000
Average people per household 2.8 2.4 1.6 2.1
Per capita income 3,250 3,708 5,563 4,762
Neighborhood poverty rate 20 37 20 21
% age 62+, head or spouse 16 32 60 34
% age 62+ or disability 34 48 74 43
% with children under 18 66 45 23 45
% single parent 57 39 20 37
% minority total 58 68 37 53
% black 39 48 23 35
% Hispanic 15 17 11 13
Minority as % of neighborhood 39 59 34 40
Source: 1997 Picture of Subsidized Households Quick Facts (http://www.huduser.org/datasets/assthsg/
picqwik.html).
Notes: Dash indicates not applicable. Most Section 236 units (67 percent) use Section 8 Loan Manage-
ment as well as Section 236 subsidy.Obviously, the overwhelming majority of eligible households do not re-
ceive housing assistance. This is not because they do not want it on the
terms oﬀered. There are long waiting lists to get into subsidized housing in
all localities, and the length of the waiting list understates excess demand
in many localities because housing authorities often close their waiting
lists when they get suﬃciently long.28
Two numbers clearly reveal the extent to which HUD’s housing assis-
tance is focused on the poorest households. Forty-three percent of the
households served by HUD’s programs are above the poverty line (HUD
1992, table 1-1), while 70 percent of renters below the poverty line are not
served (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991, table 4-12; HUD 1992, table
1-1).
6.4 Program Eﬀects
This section discusses what program eﬀects should be expected based on
each program’s rules and the general assumptions of economic theory, and
it describes the evidence on important eﬀects of public housing, Section
236, Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation, and tenant-
based Section 8 certiﬁcates and vouchers. To the best of my knowledge, no
research on Section 515 or the LIHTC deals with the eﬀects considered in
this paper except their cost-eﬀectiveness.
One theme of this section is that little can be said about many eﬀects of
government housing programs based on the usual assumptions of eco-
nomic theory even combined with plausible additional assumptions such
as the normality of housing and leisure. For example, housing programs
change budget spaces in ways that do not imply that recipients will occupy
better housing or work less.
6.4.1 Cost-Eﬀectiveness
Since large sums of money are spent on housing subsidies and many
diﬀerent methods are used to deliver them, it is important to consider the
cost-eﬀectiveness of alternative approaches. When needlessly expensive
methods of delivering housing assistance are used, many low-income
households who could have been provided with adequate housing at an
aﬀordable rent within the current budget continue to live in deplorable
housing.
All cost-eﬀectiveness analyses of housing programs involve a compari-
son of the total cost of providing the housing with its market rent, an index
of the overall desirability of the dwelling. For tenant-based vouchers and
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28. HUD does not regularly collect data on the size of the waiting lists under any of its pro-
grams. However, a telephone survey in 1999 by HUD staﬀ revealed that the Los Angeles
Housing Authority alone had 342,000 households on its waiting list for Section 8 vouchers.certiﬁcates, the approach is straightforward because all of the costs associ-
ated with providing the housing during a period occur in that period and
they are all in the records of the administering agency. Estimating a statis-
tical relationship between the rent and characteristics of unsubsidized
apartments and then substituting the characteristics of the subsidized
units into it yields estimates of the market rents of the units occupied by
subsidized households.
Dealing with construction or rehabilitation programs is more diﬃcult
because the time path of cost bears no particular relationship to the time
path of the market rent of a unit, and all of these programs involve indirect
costs that are not in the records of the administering agency. The most
widely accepted measure of cost-eﬀectiveness for programs of this type is
the ratio of (a) the present value of the rents paid by tenants and all direct
and indirect costs incurred by federal, state, and local governments to (b)
the present value of the market rents of the units over the period that the
units are used to house subsidized families. If a government owns the proj-
ect at the time that it stops being used to house subsidized families, the
present value of the project’s market value at that time should be sub-
tracted from the present value of the costs. A severe practical problem in
implementing this approach is that data on the condition of the apartments
in subsidized housing projects over their lives are not available, and some
of the costs are diﬃcult to obtain for each year. As a result, only one study
(HUD 1974, 123–28) has fully implemented this approach. Other studies
take various shortcuts or rely on strong assumptions about missing data.
This measure of cost-eﬀectiveness focuses on eﬀectiveness in providing
housing to the recipient. It does not capture beneﬁts or costs of a housing
program to others. For example, it is possible that some housing projects
make the neighborhoods in which they are located more attractive places to
live. Other projects may have the opposite eﬀect. The standard measure of
cost-eﬀectiveness captures neither positive nor negative eﬀects of this sort.
Broadly speaking, there are three potential sources of cost-ineﬀectiveness
of housing programs—distortions in input usage in the production of hous-
ing services, insuﬃcient incentives for eﬃciency on the part of civil servants,
and excessive proﬁts to developers of private projects. This section discusses
each source.
Almost all of the subsidies for housing projects are subsidies for the ini-
tial development of the project or subsidies that are independent of the mix
of inputs used to provide a particular quantity of housing service. For ex-
ample, some programs provide direct loans for development at below-
market interest rates, others pay a ﬁxed proportion of the mortgage pay-
ment on private loans, still others provide tax credits that are proportional
to development cost, and some pay directly the entire development cost.
Among subsidies that do not depend on input usage are rental assistance
payments under the Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilita-
Housing Programs for Low-Income Households 395tion Program and public housing operating subsidies since 1975. (Recall
that the latter do not depend on the housing authority’s actions.)
The preceding facts about the nature of the subsidy have led some to
conclude that housing services in these projects will be produced with too
much initial capital and too little of other inputs from the viewpoint of eﬃ-
cient production. However, since all of these programs contain limits on
per-unit development cost, the net eﬀect on input usage is ambiguous on
theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, the combination of capital subsidies
and development cost limits surely results in some productive ineﬃciency.
This argument applies most directly to for-proﬁt ﬁrms that own and oper-
ate housing for low-income households. However, to the extent that the de-
cision makers in local housing authorities and the nonproﬁts who sponsor
subsidized projects are interested in the well-being of their tenants rather
than other taxpayers, they apply with some force to them as well.
Another incentive for ineﬃcient production of housing services in pri-
vately owned projects is that the supplier’s revenue is independent of the
condition of the apartment, provided that it meets the program’s minimum
occupancy standards. Given the below-market rents that subsidized
households are charged, there is a tremendous excess demand for these
units for many years after they are built. Therefore, owners will have no
trouble renting them even if they are allowed to deteriorate substantially.
Just as in the case of simple rent control, this should lead to too little main-
tenance from the viewpoint of eﬃcient production of housing services.
The absence of important incentives facing administrators of public
housing is another source of ineﬃciency. Under the public housing pro-
gram, government employees make all of the decisions that are made by
managers of proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms in the private market. These include
the exact speciﬁcations of the project to be built and exactly what mainte-
nance and renovations to undertake. These decisionmakers also must
monitor the performance of the employees of the housing authorities. The
government managers involved do not have the same ﬁnancial incentives
to operate eﬃciently as owners of private rental housing. If they make
good decisions, they are not rewarded. If they make bad decisions, they
suﬀer no consequences over a wide range of bad decisions. Indeed, they
cannot easily learn whether they have made good or bad decisions. Due to
the subsidy, they will not lose their tenants unless they make extraordinar-
ily bad decisions.
The other construction and rehabilitation programs such as Section 8
New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation and the LIHTC provide
subsidies to selected private suppliers, albeit with restrictions concerning
who may live in the units, how much rent may be charged, and the like. The
subsidies and restrictions are designed (or redesigned based on initial ex-
perience) to insure that the money budgeted is spent. In all cases, the result
has been that many more suppliers want to participate than can be accom-
396 Edgar O. Olsenmodated with available funds. For example, developers have requested
three times as much money as state housing agencies have to allocate un-
der the LIHTC in recent years. The reason for the excess demand for pro-
gram funds by suppliers of housing is that those who are allowed to par-
ticipate make excessive proﬁts, provided that they do not have to pay
anything for the privilege. This explains the bribery and inﬂuence peddling
under these programs that periodically comes to light.
Four major studies attempt to compare the costs incurred to provide
units under various housing programs with the market rents of these
units.29Table 6.7 reports the results of these studies. In assessing the results
in this table, it is important to realize that the Olsen-Barton and HUD
studies of public housing did not include the extra cost of administering a
means-tested program (such as checking eligibility) as opposed to the cost
of managing the housing. The other studies did include all administrative
cost. Including all administrative costs would add about 14 percent to the
total cost of public housing in the Olsen-Barton and HUD studies. Fur-
thermore, the study of the Section 8 New Construction Program did not
include any indirect costs such as the tax exemption of the interest on state
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29. See Olsen (2000) for a description and appraisal of the data and methods used in these
studies. This paper also discusses a study by Schnare et al. (1982) that focuses on diﬀerences
in development costs across programs and contains problematic results on overall cost-
eﬀectiveness. Weinberg (1982) summarizes the research in Wallace et al. (1981) and Mayo
(1986) summarizes his studies of the cost-eﬀectiveness of U.S. and German housing pro-
grams.
Table 6.7 Ratio of Present Value of Cost to Present Value of Market Rent
Source Location Year Ratio
Housing vouchers
Mayo et al. (1980b) Phoenix 1975 1.09
Mayo et al. (1980b) Pittsburgh 1975 1.15
Wallace et al. (1981) National 1979 0.91
Public housing
Olsen and Barton (1983) New York City 1965 1.14a
Olsen and Barton (1983) New York City 1968 1.10a
HUD (1974) Baltimore, Boston, Los Angeles, St. Louis
San Francisco, Washington 1971 1.17a
Mayo et al. (1980b) Phoenix 1975 1.79
Mayo et al. (1980b) Pittsburgh 1975 2.20
Section 236
Mayo et al. (1980b) Phoenix 1975 1.47
Mayo et al. (1980b) Pittsburgh 1975 2.01
Section 8 New Construction
Wallace et al. (1981) National 1979 1.24b
aExcludes cost of program administration of about 14 percent.
bExcludes all indirect costs estimated to add 20 percent to 30 percent.bonds issued to ﬁnance state housing agency projects and the interest sub-
sidy involved in the Tandem Plan ﬁnancing of FHA-insured projects. Pre-
vious research on the magnitudes of these subsidies led Wallace and his
coauthors to conclude that these indirect subsidies add 20 to 30 percent to
the total cost of the projects.
With the aforementioned adjustments to insure comparability, these
studies are unanimous in ﬁnding that it costs signiﬁcantly more than a dol-
lar to provide a dollar’s worth of housing under construction programs
such as public housing, Section 236, and Section 8 New Construction. The
studies of housing certiﬁcates and vouchers show that the total costs of
these programs exceed the market rents of the units by approximately the
cost of administering the program. Excluding administrative cost, the two
earliest studies ﬁnd excess costs of public housing in the range of 10 to 17
percent. The more recent studies ﬁnd excess costs for this program in the
range of 65 to 106 percent. The range of the estimated excess cost of Sec-
tion 236 is 33 to 87 percent, and the estimated excess cost of Section 8 New
Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation is 30 to 40 percent.
These estimates almost surely understate the extent of the ineﬃciency of
construction programs compared with tenant-based certiﬁcates and
vouchers for two reasons. First, the studies using data before 1975 based
their estimates of market rent on an estimated hedonic equation contain-
ing a short list of easily observed housing characteristics. Older public
housing projects did not have many of the unobserved amenities that were
common in the private sector. So there is good reason to expect the esti-
mated hedonic equation to overstate the market rents of public housing
units. The more recent studies are based on much more detailed data on
housing characteristics and hence are likely to provide more accurate esti-
mates of the market rents of public housing units. Second, unlike tenant-
based assistance, the construction programs involve indirect subsidies that
do not appear in the program’s records. All studies attempt to estimate the
magnitude of the major indirect subsidies. However, no study attempts to
estimate the magnitude of all of the indirect subsidies. For example, some
public housing units were built on land donated by federal, state, and local
governments. No study has attempted to add the market value of this land
to the cost of public housing. Nonproﬁt developers of Section 8 New Con-
struction projects sometimes receive property tax exemptions or abate-
ments. No study has attempted to account for this indirect subsidy.
The U.S. GAO (2001, 2002) provides similar results for the major active
construction programs—LIHTC, HOPE VI, Section 202, Section 515,
and Section 811. Using the conceptually preferable life cycle approach, the
excess total cost estimates range from at least 12 percent for Section 811 to
at least 27 percent for HOPE VI (GAO 2001, 3).
The GAO study will not be the last word on the cost-eﬀectiveness of the
programs studied. Like the previous studies, this study ignores some im-
398 Edgar O. Olsenportant costs of production programs. For example, all HOPE VI projects
receive substantial local property tax abatements. The GAO analysis ig-
nores this cost to local taxpayers. It also ignores the cost of demolishing old
structures on the sites of HOPE VI projects and assumes that the oppor-
tunity cost of the land is zero. Obviously, the excess cost of HOPE VI is
substantially understated on these accounts. The other major shortcom-
ings of the study are that it is based on assumptions about costs beyond the
ﬁrst year that are not rooted in actual program experience and it fails to ac-
count for diﬀerences in the desirability of the housing over the period of
time considered.30Instead it simply compares the average cost of units with
the same number of bedrooms in the same type of location (metropolitan
or nonmetropolitan). Clearly, the GAO study is improvable in many re-
spects. However, it provides the only independent cost-eﬀectiveness anal-
ysis of these programs.
An inﬂuential view in discussions of housing policy is that subsidized
new construction is needed in localities with the lowest vacancy rates. This
suggests that construction programs will be more cost-eﬀective than
vouchers in these areas. Obviously, the small number of studies of cost-
eﬀectiveness and the diﬀerent methodologies used in these studies preclude
making any deﬁnitive judgment about this matter. Whether there are any
market conditions under which construction programs are more cost-
eﬀective than vouchers is surely one of the most important unanswered
questions in housing policy analysis.
The GAO study contains suggestive evidence. In addition to the national
estimates, the GAO collected data for seven metropolitan areas. The data
for the GAO study refer to projects built in 1999. In that year, the rental va-
cancy rates in the seven metropolitan areas ranged from 3.1 percent in
Boston to 7.2 percent in Baltimore and Dallas, with a median of 5.6 per-
cent. The overall rental vacancy rate in U.S. metropolitan areas was 7.8
percent. So all of the speciﬁc markets studied were tighter than average.
Only ﬁve of the largest seventy-ﬁve metropolitan areas had vacancy rates
lower than Boston’s. In each market, tenant-based vouchers were more
cost-eﬀective than each production program studied (GAO 2002, tables 7
and 8).
6.4.2 Consumption Patterns
Since housing programs are intended to produce particular changes in
consumption of housing services compared with consumption of other
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30. Lobbyists for construction programs always argue that these programs produce better
housing than that occupied by voucher recipients. Although this is typically true when the
units are new, it is not true over the entire time that the units are used for subsidized housing.
David Vandenbroucke’s unpublished research indicates that in eight of the eleven metropoli-
tan areas studied the median market rent of voucher units exceeded the median market rents
of units in both public and subsidized private projects.goods, knowledge of these changes is important for evaluating the pro-
grams. This section explains why the design of housing programs does not
insure that the programs change consumption patterns in a way that is con-
sistent with their justiﬁcations. It also describes the empirical evidence on
the eﬀects of the programs on overall consumption of housing services and
other goods.
Ideally, a theoretical analysis of the possible eﬀects of housing programs
on consumption patterns would consider all of the other welfare programs
for which a household is eligible in describing its budget space in the ab-
sence of the housing program and deﬁne preferences over at least three
composites—housing, other produced goods, and leisure. This has never
been done in a theoretical analysis.31In this section, we will follow the more
traditional approach in the literature, namely to assume that income is not
subject to choice and that households would face a linear budget frontier
deﬁned by this income and market prices for all goods in the absence of
housing subsidies. These assumptions underlie almost all empirical studies
of the eﬀects of housing programs on consumption patterns. Even with
these simplifying assumptions, little can be said on theoretical grounds
about the eﬀect of any housing program on consumption of housing and
other goods. For example, the public housing program could induce house-
holds to consume more housing services and consume less of other goods,
more of all goods, or less housing service and more of other goods.
To see why the usual assumptions of economic theory have no important
implications for consumption of housing services and other produced
goods under any form of project-based assistance, consider ﬁgure 6.3. In
this ﬁgure, consumption of housing services is measured on the horizontal
axis and consumption of other produced goods on the vertical axis.32 The
line segment is the budget line in the absence of the housing subsidy. Since
housing assistance is not an entitlement, each subsidized privately owned
project and each local housing authority has a waiting list. When a unit be-
comes available, it is oﬀered to a household on the waiting list of an ap-
propriate size for that apartment. This apartment provides a certain quan-
tity of housing service QG
Hand the rent that the eligible household must pay
enables it to consume a certain quantity of other goods QG
X. Normally, if
the household declines the oﬀer, it is removed from the waiting list. In some
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31. Schone (1994) accounts for several major welfare programs and taxes in her empirical
study of the eﬀects of housing and other programs on consumption patterns, which will be
discussed when we consider work disincentive eﬀects.
32. The quantity of housing service is an index of all of the attributes of housing valued by
consumers, including its neighborhood characteristics. In much of the empirical literature, it
is measured by the market rent of the dwelling divided by a housing price index. A housing
price index across areas or over time is the market rent of dwellings with the same character-
istics. The more comprehensive the list of housing characteristics, the better the housing price
index. A few studies based on the housing occupied immediately before and after receipt of
housing assistance provide information on the program’s eﬀect on a few particular housing
characteristics.cases, the household is allowed to decline several oﬀers before removal.
This does not change the argument in any fundamental way. In essence, the
household is oﬀered an all-or-nothing choice of a particular bundle. The
household accepting this oﬀer might choose bundle A, B, or C in the ab-
sence of the program. Therefore, the program can have any eﬀect on the
consumption bundle of a participant other than reducing its consumption
of both goods.
The same conclusion is reached for any type of tenant-based assistance
that has been used except for the form of housing voucher that was used
between 1983 and 1999. Figure 6.4 depicts the budget spaces of eligible
households who were oﬀered assistance under the major certiﬁcate and
voucher programs. In this diagram, Yis the household’s income and P Hand
P X are unsubsidized prices of housing services and other goods. Since par-
ticipation in these programs is voluntary, a household that is oﬀered assis-
tance can consume any bundle on or below the usual budget line deﬁned by
these parameters. All of these programs of tenant-based assistance require
recipients to live in apartments meeting minimum housing standards in or-
der to receive assistance. To describe the budget space accurately, it would
be necessary to decompose the housing bundle into its components be-
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Fig. 6.3 Budget space for project-based programcause the standards apply to some, but not all, characteristics of housing.
When a scalar index of the quantity of housing services is used, this con-
straint places a lower limit on housing consumption QH
MIN as a condition
for receipt of a subsidy.33
Under the original certiﬁcate program, participants had to occupy units
renting for less than the local fair market rent (FMR) for units of the size
occupied. The FMR in an area for units with a certain number of bed-
rooms has always been the rent at a speciﬁed percentile of the distribution
of rents of a subset of units of this size. Currently, it is the 40th percentile
of the rents of standard quality units occupied within the past ﬁfteen
months and not built within the last two years.34 Since there is an upper
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Fig. 6.4 Budget spaces under Section 8 certiﬁcate and voucher programs
33. In research on these programs, this minimum quantity has been measured as the mar-
ket rent of units that just meet the program’s standards but are minimal in other respects di-
vided by a housing price index (Olsen and Reeder 1983; Cutts and Olsen 2002).
34. Fair market rents apply to entire metropolitan areas and their surrounding counties and
groups of nonmetropolitan counties. They are published in the Federal Register each year (for
example, 64FR53450) and are available on the HUD website. For the purpose of establishing
FMRs, a standard quality unit is a dwelling that is adequate according to the deﬁnition used
in the American Housing Survey. This characterization is based on the detailed housing char-
acteristics collected in the survey.limit on the number of bedrooms that may be occupied by each household
depending upon its size and composition and a ceiling rent for apartments
of each size, the FMR places an upper limit FMR/P H on each participant’s
consumption of housing services.35A participant that occupied a unit rent-
ing for the applicable FMR paid a fraction   of its adjusted income Y – A
in rent. (The fraction is currently .3.) In this case, the subsidy was FMR –
  (Y – A) and the participant’s consumption of other goods would be
[Y –   (Y – A)]/P x. If the participant occupied a unit renting for less than
the applicable FMR, she paid a fraction   (Y – A)/FMR of the rent.
Therefore, the budget space under the original certiﬁcate program was the
areas A and B in ﬁgure 6.4.
The feature of the original certiﬁcate program that reduced the rent of a
tenant occupying a unit renting for less than the FMR was intended to cre-
ate an incentive for participants to be economical. However, surveys re-
vealed that few participants understood the rent reduction credit, and it
was eliminated in 1980. The budget space under the revised certiﬁcate pro-
gram was the area A.
The voucher program that was introduced as a demonstration in 1983
and operated simultaneously with the certiﬁcate program had a simpler
structure. It paid a ﬁxed amount toward the participant’s rent provided
that the participant occupied a unit meeting the program’s standards. The
ﬁxed amount was PS –   (Y – A), where PS refers to the payment stan-
dard. The payment standard for households of each size and composition
could not exceed the applicable FMR, but housing authorities could set
payment standards at lower levels.36 For simplicity, ﬁgure 6.4 assumes that
PS is equal to FMR. In this case, the budget space under the original
voucher program is areas A, B, C, D, and E.
The preceding certiﬁcate and voucher programs are being phased out in
favor of a voucher program that has some features of each of its predeces-
sors. Starting from the budget space under the most recent certiﬁcate pro-
gram (the area A), the new voucher program enables participants to oc-
cupy apartments renting for more than FMR, but neither increases nor
decreases their subsidy if they do it. The program places an upper limit on
housing consumption by limiting the tenant’s contribution to rent to 40
percent of adjusted income. The tenant’s contribution is simply the excess
of the rent received by the landlord over the government’s subsidy, FMR –
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35. Given the methodology used to calculate them, diﬀerences in FMRs between areas do
not reﬂect only geographical diﬀerences in housing prices, that is, the diﬀerence in the mean
rent of identical units in diﬀerent areas. Therefore, the ceiling on housing consumption has
been diﬀerent for identical households in diﬀerent localities.
36. Since each authority was allocated a ﬁxed amount of money, setting the payment stan-
dard below the FMR enabled it to serve more households. Under the Certiﬁcate Program, the
authority was allocated a certain number of certiﬁcates. This created an incentive for each au-
thority to lobby for higher FMRs in its area to increase the subsidies received by local resi-
dents.  (Y– A). Since  is currently .3, the upper limit on housing consumption
is currently FMR   .1   (Y – A).
If housing is a normal good, the type of voucher program in operation
between 1983 and 1999 will induce households to occupy better housing
than in the absence of the program, although not necessarily better than
they would choose if given a cash grant equal to the amount of the housing
subsidy. This type of voucher could have the same eﬀect as the cash grant
for some, all, or none of its recipients. It is easy to show that each of the
other certiﬁcate or voucher programs can have any eﬀect on consumption
patterns of recipients except less of both goods.
In short, the design of housing programs does not insure that these pro-
grams change consumption patterns in a way that is consistent with their
justiﬁcations. It is an empirical matter whether they have the desired
eﬀects.
The available evidence reported in table 6.8 strongly suggests that all
housing programs result in substantially better housing for participants.
The percentage increase tends to be greatest for new construction pro-
grams in their early years, when most of the units are new. As the average
age of the units under a construction program increases, the percentage in-
crease in housing consumption of participants declines. The results re-
ported in table 6.9illustrate this feature of construction programs. In 1970,
the median age of public housing units was twenty-two years and the mean
market rent of these units diﬀered little from the mean rent of all unsubsi-
dized rental units. At the same time, all Section 236 units were only a few
years old. The mean market rent of these units was almost twice as great as
the mean rent of all unsubsidized rental units.
Almost all housing programs at almost all times have also increased the
consumption of other goods by participants. That is, participants spend
less on housing than they would have spent in the absence of the program.
Because the overwhelming majority of participants in each housing pro-
gram pay the same percentage of their adjusted income for rent, there is
little diﬀerence in expenditure on other goods among households with the
same income. Expenditure on other goods under the program diﬀers on ac-
count of diﬀerent adjustments to income and possibly because the house-
hold must pay more than 30 percent of adjusted income in order to live in
a privately owned subsidized project (about 25 percent of the households
in privately owned HUD projects are in this category).
The numbers reported in table 6.8 indicate that the percentage increase
in consumption of other goods is less than the percentage increase in hous-
ing consumption in public housing, that the opposite is true for tenant-
based certiﬁcates, and that Section 236 had little eﬀect on consumption of
other goods in its early years when the rent schedule required the poorest
participants to pay a ﬂat rent exceeding 25 percent of their income. Cur-
rently, about two-thirds of the occupants of Section 236 units pay 30 per-
404 Edgar O. Olsencent of their adjusted income in rent because they receive project-based
Section 8 subsidies, and so this program’s eﬀect on consumption of other
goods is almost surely positive now.
Unfortunately, the contract reports done for HUD have consistently
failed to calculate the percentage increase in consumption of other goods
resulting from the programs studied or to provide the relevant mean in-
comes that would allow others to do it. However, these studies do indicate
the dollar magnitude of the decrease in expenditure on housing. Ignoring
work disincentive eﬀects, this is the dollar magnitude of the increase in ex-
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Table 6.8 Percentage Increase in Consumption of Housing and Other Goods
Housing Other
Source Location Year (%) (%)
Public housing
Olsen and Barton (1983) New York City 1965 58 17
Olsen and Barton (1983) New York City 1968 66 17
HUD (1974) Austin, Boston, Honolulu,  1971 82 19
Indianapolis, Minneapolis, 
Pittsburgh, Washington
HUD (1974) Baltimore, Boston, Los Angeles,  1971 71 16
St. Louis, San Francisco, 
Washington
HUD (1974) Boston, Pittsburgh, St. Louis,  1971 59 5
San Francisco, Washington
Kraft and Olsen (1977) National 1971 33 14
Mayo et al. (1980a) Phoenix 1975 35 n.a.
Mayo et al. (1980a) Pittsburgh 1975 22 n.a.
Hammond (1987) National 1977 41 a
Section 236
HUD (1974) n.a. 1972 51 0
Mayo et al. (1980a) Phoenix 1975 31 n.a.
Mayo et al. (1980a) Pittsburgh 1975 26 n.a.
Section 8 New Construction
Wallace et al. (1981) National 1979 58 n.a.
Section 8 Existing 
(tenant-based)
Reeder (1985) National 1976 16 50
Wallace et al. (1981) National 1979 31 n.a.





Hammond (1987) National 1977 40 a
Notes: N.a. indicates not available. The percentage increase in consumption is the percentage increase
in the real market value (that is, market value divided by an index of the prices of the goods in a cate-
gory).
aNot comparable with other results due to intertemporal approach used.penditure on other goods. These studies consistently report that housing
programs lead to decreases in housing expenditure.
A careful consideration of the justiﬁcations for housing subsidies to the
poor suggests that a housing program is not successful unless it induces the
worst-housed households with each income to occupy better housing and
consume less of other goods than they would choose if they were given cash
grants involving the same subsidy.37 These are the households who under-
value housing in the eyes of paternalistic altruists. Since other programs
such as food stamps and Medicaid are intended to induce households who
overvalue housing in the eyes of paternalistic altruists (that is, households
with excessive rent burdens) to consume more nonhousing goods than they
would choose if they were given cash grants involving the same subsidy, it
is not clear how housing programs should change the consumption pat-
terns of these households.
Since substantial empirical evidence supports the view that the mean in-
come elasticity of demand for housing is no greater than one, the results in
table 6.8 strongly suggest that in aggregate occupants of public housing
projects consume more housing services than they would consume if given
cash grants equal to their housing subsidies. If the relevant numbers had
been included in the reports of HUD’s contractors, it might have been pos-
sible to make similar statements about other programs.
Although many studies compare housing consumption with and with-
out the program, only four make the more relevant comparison between
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Table 6.9 Mean Gross Market Rents of Subsidized and Unsubsidized Units, 1970
Section 236
Unsubsidized Public
Metropolitan Area All Renters Housing New Rehabilitated
Baltimore 116 113 — —
Boston 135 125 245 206
Los Angeles 128 117 — —
Pittsburgh 110 92 226 214
St. Louis 97 103 224 —
San Francisco 144 133 224 —
Washington, D.C. 134 136 215 197
Source: HUD (1974, tables 18 and 31).
Notes:Dashes indicate data not available. The mean rents for all renters include the rents paid
by subsidized households. Since the mean rent paid by subsidized households was below the
mean rent of unsubsidized households, these mean rents understate the mean rent of unsub-
sidized households. However, since less than 5 percent of renters received housing assistance,
the bias is surely small. Section 236 market rents are from 1972–73 data, adjusted to 1970 dol-
lars using a national consumer price index.
37. The subsidy is the excess of the market value of goods consumed under the program
over the market value of goods consumed in the absence of the program.housing consumption under the program and housing consumption with
cash grants equal to the housing subsidies. Table 6.10reports the results of
these studies. They show that public housing, tenant-based Section 8 cer-
tiﬁcates, and the entire system of housing subsidies increase housing con-
sumption more in aggregate than unrestricted cash grants in the afore-
mentioned amounts.
The existing studies do not tell us whether the households whose con-
sumption is “distorted” toward housing by these programs would have
been among the worst-housed households with the same budget constraint
in the absence of housing assistance. Recall that the rationale for housing
subsidies implies that these are the households who should be encouraged
to consume more housing than they would with a cash grant.
In deciding how many households should be subsidized to consume
housing beyond the levels resulting from cash grants, it is important to re-
alize that the overwhelming majority of households eligible for housing as-
sistance would not live in housing with severe or moderate physical prob-
lems or more than one person per room in the absence of the assistance.
(See HUD 2000, A28–A29 for HUD’s deﬁnition of these terms.) In 1997,
only 23 percent of unassisted eligible households lived in such housing
(HUD 2000, table A5). Since the preprogram housing of recipients of
housing assistance diﬀers little from the housing of all eligible households
(Wallace et al. 1981, 171), about three-fourths of all eligible households
would not have these housing problems in the absence of housing pro-
grams.
6.4.3 Neighborhoods of Assisted Households
The landmark 1949 Housing Act established as a goal of low-income
housing policy the achievement of a suitable neighborhood for all Ameri-
cans, and a few studies have estimated the extent to which housing pro-
grams achieve this goal. In the absence of housing subsidies, each assisted
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Table 6.10 Percentage Increase in Housing Consumption Beyond Cash Grants
Source Location Year % Increase
Public housing
Olsen and Barton (1983) New York City 1965 48
Olsen and Barton (1983) New York City 1968 53
Hammond (1987) National 1977 40
Schone (1994) National 1984 49
Section 8 Existing (tenant-based)
Reeder (1985) National 1976 10
All programs
Hammond (1987) National 1977 39
Note: Cash grant involved in these calculations is equal to the subsidy (that is, market rent
minus tenant rent) rather than the cost to taxpayers.household would live in a neighborhood with certain characteristics. With
housing assistance, many of these households live in neighborhoods with
diﬀerent characteristics. This section summarizes the evidence on the
diﬀerence in neighborhood characteristics for program participants.
Before considering program eﬀects, it is useful to provide some infor-
mation on the neighborhoods occupied by households under the three
broad types of rental housing assistance. Until quite recently, good na-
tional information on the neighborhoods in which subsidized households
live did not exist. Sandra Newman and her collaborators have remedied
this deﬁciency. (See Newman and Schnare 1997 for a description of the
database that they have assembled and some initial results based on it.)
Table 6.11reports one of the results of their eﬀorts. It shows that the neigh-
borhoods occupied by public-housing tenants have many more house-
holds with incomes below the poverty line than the neighborhoods occu-
pied by recipients of other types of project-based assistance, certiﬁcates
and vouchers, and welfare recipients. Recipients of certiﬁcates and vouch-
ers live in noticeably better neighborhoods in this regard than households
in the other categories.
If households under each broad type of housing assistance would live in
neighborhoods with the same characteristics as welfare-recipient neigh-
borhoods in the absence of housing subsidies, table 6.11 would indicate the
eﬀect of housing subsidies on the neighborhoods of assisted households.
However, since there are some marked diﬀerences in the characteristics of
the households served by the three types of program (see table 6.6), it is not
reasonable to expect that average characteristics of the neighborhoods of
the households in these three groups would be the same in the absence of a
housing subsidy. So we must look elsewhere for estimates of the eﬀect of
housing subsidies on the neighborhoods of assisted households.
A number of studies attempt to estimate this program eﬀect directly by
comparing the characteristics of the neighborhoods of households imme-
diately before and after receipt of a housing subsidy. Tables 6.12 through
6.15report some results of studies of the project-based Section 8 New Con-
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Table 6.11 Distribution of Units by Poverty Rate (%)
Assisted Housing
Public Private Certiﬁcates Welfare All  Rental
Housing Developments and Vouchers Households Units
Less than 10% 7.5 27.4 27.5 25.3 42.1
10–29% 38.9 50.7 57.8 51.0 45.4
20–39% 17.1 11.5 9.5 12.1 6.8
40% or more 36.5 10.4 5.3 11.6 5.7
Source: Newman and Schnare (1997, table 3).Table 6.12 Minority Percentage of All Households by Location Before and After
Enrollment: Section 8 New Construction and Substantial
Rehabilitation Program
Destination (%)
Origin Central City Suburb All Locations
Central city 57 11 68
Suburb 2 30 32
All locations 59 41 100
Source: Wallace et al. (1981, table 3-8).
Note: The sample size is 1,385 observations.
Table 6.13 Mean Change in Minority Concentration from Origin Tract to Destination Tract
for Major Demographic Groups: Section 8 New Construction and
Substantial Rehabilitation
Mean % Mean %  Mean
Minority in Minority in Change in % 
Household Type N Tract of Origin Destination Tract Minority (%)
Black 1,001 54 35 –19
Hispanic 184 34 32 –2.3
Minority 1,314 47 32 –15
Nonminority white 5,918 7.2 7.0 0.2
Source: Wallace et al. (1981, table 3-9).
Table 6.14 Income and Housing Market Characteristics of Census Tracts Occupied
by Recipients Before and After Participation: Section 8 Existing
Housing Voucher Certiﬁcate
Program Program
Median Family Income (1,000s)
Stayers 13.3 13.3
Movers’ origin tract 12.6 12.5
Movers’ destination tract 13.7 13.5
% of families receiving welfare
Stayers 16.2 16.9
Movers’ origin tract 19.3 19.9
Movers’ destination tract 17.2 16.1
Median monthly rent
Stayers 233 240
Movers’ origin tract 217 215
Movers’ destination tract 235 234
% of units without adequate plumbing
Stayers 2.6 2.6
Movers’ origin tract 2.6 2.2
Movers’ destination tract 1.7 1.9
Source: Leger and Kennedy (1990b, tables 4.20 and 4.22).struction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program and the tenant-based Sec-
tion 8 Existing Housing Program. The data underlying these studies are for
a random sample of units in a random sample of projects (in the case of
project-based assistance) within a random sample of urban areas.
Table 6.12 reveals that 57 percent of the minority households who
moved into Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation proj-
ects lived in the central city before and after their move and that 32 percent
lived in the suburbs before and after their move. Only 11 percent of these
households moved from the central city to the suburbs. So this program
does not induce mass migration of minorities from central cities to sub-
urbs.
Table 6.13 indicates that participation in this program typically induced
black households to move to a neighborhood with a substantially lower
minority percentage.
Tables 6.14 and 6.15 show the eﬀects of the tenant-based Section 8 Ex-
isting Housing Program on the types of neighborhoods in which assisted
households live. Many participants in this program receive subsidies with-
out moving because their initial units already meet the program’s stan-
dards or (less often) are repaired to meet the standards and they choose not
to move, at least initially. The program has no immediate eﬀect on their
neighborhoods. Table 6.14 indicates that those households who move on
receipt of the subsidy have fewer poor neighbors and live in neighborhoods
where the housing is better. However, these eﬀects are modest. Table 6.15
indicates that tenant-based certiﬁcates and vouchers also have a modest
eﬀect in reducing racial segregation in housing.
Finally, studies done as a part of the Experimental Housing Allowance
Program indicated that public housing induces its participants to live in
neighborhoods with a much higher fraction of low-income households and
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Table 6.15 Change in Racial/Ethnic Concentration of Tracts Occupied by Black





Origin census tract 75.8 77.1
Destination census tract 73.8 73.7
% Hispanic
Origin census tract 7.9 8.8
Destination census tract 8.4 94
% black
Origin census tract 63.9 64.0
Destination census tract 61.9 61.2
Source: Leger and Kennedy (1990b, table 4.25B).its black participants to live in neighborhoods with a signiﬁcantly higher
fraction of minority households (Kennedy 1980, tables 3-9 and 3-14).
All of the preceding studies estimate the immediate eﬀect of housing
programs on the types of neighborhoods in which assisted households live.
No studies attempt to estimate the long-run eﬀect of the programs on the
location of households. That is, none attempt to estimate the movement of
other households and the changes in the housing stock in response to the
initial changes in the location of assisted households.
6.4.4 Work Disincentives
Since low-income housing programs are means tested, it is plausible to
believe that they will have work disincentive eﬀects. This section describes
how the magnitude of housing assistance varies with labor earnings, con-
siders what can be said based on general economic theory about work dis-
incentive eﬀects of housing programs, and discusses empirical research on
this topic.
Low-income housing programs are means-tested in two senses. With mi-
nor exceptions, all programs mentioned in this paper have always been
means-tested in the sense that there have been upper income limits for eli-
gibility for households of each size.38Even the programs that have not been
means-tested in this sense for all participants over their entire histories
have had income limits for many participants for at least twenty years pri-
marily because some occupants of older projects now receive extra subsi-
dies under other programs that have income limits.
The largest programs (Section 8 certiﬁcates and vouchers, and public
housing) and three-fourths of the units in privately owned HUD projects
are also means-tested in the sense that the magnitude of the subsidy re-
ceived by a household occupying a particular dwelling depends upon its
earned income (HUD 1997, 3). All units in the Section 8 New Construc-
tion Program, the largest HUD program involving privately owned proj-
ects, are means-tested in this sense. For more than ﬁfteen years, the tenant
has paid 30 percent of adjusted income in rent under these programs.39
Under some project-based programs such as the LIHTC, Section
221(d)(3), and Section 202 (older projects), the subsidy does not depend on
income unless the unit or household receives a subsidy from some other
source. In each of these cases, the basic program reduces the rent for each
unit below the market rent, and the occupant pays this rent independent of
its income. However, as far back as 1965, some households in the projects
funded under these programs have received additional subsidies that re-
duced their rents to a ﬁxed fraction of their incomes, and a signiﬁcant mi-
Housing Programs for Low-Income Households 411
38. The primary exceptions have been the Section 202 and Section 221(d)(3) MIR.
39. This ignores several alternative rent schemes that applied to a small minority of recipi-
ents.nority of the current participants in these programs receives these extra
subsidies. For example, about 40 percent of LIHTC units receive Section 8
assistance (GAO 1997, 40).
The basic Section 236 program was between the two extremes of pro-
portional adjustment of rent to changes in adjusted income for all partici-
pants and no adjustment of rent for all participants. Under the basic pro-
gram, all households who occupied identical units in a Section 236 project
and had incomes below a certain level paid the same rent.40 If income ex-
ceeded the cutoﬀ, the rent was 25 percent of adjusted income. Therefore,
the beneﬁt reduction rate was zero at low levels of income and .25 at higher
levels. Substantial numbers of households were in each category.
Between 1965 and 1974, some, but not all, of the poorest households liv-
ing in Section 236 projects received rent supplements that reduced their
rents to 25 percent of their adjusted incomes over a larger range of adjusted
income. After 1974, many more of the poorest households in Section 236
projects received subsidies under the Section 8 Loan Management Set-
Aside Program that initially reduced their rents to 25 percent of their ad-
justed incomes and later to 30 percent.41
In studying the work disincentive eﬀects of housing programs, it is im-
portant to realize that the subsidy is not the same function of earnings for
all households with the same characteristics, even within a given program
and the same locality. The subsidy is the excess of the market rent of the
unit occupied over the rent paid by the tenant. The preceding paragraphs
pointed out the diﬀerences in the rents paid by households with the same
characteristics under some programs. Even more important are the enor-
mous diﬀerences in the market rents of the units occupied by similar
households under all mature construction programs. The newest units un-
der these programs are typically very good and hence have a high market
rent. The worst are deplorable in part because the program’s minimum oc-
cupancy standards are not always enforced. The maximum subsidy within
a locality under each certiﬁcate or voucher program is the same for house-
holds with the same characteristics. However, the maximum real subsidy
under this program to a household with the same real income will vary
across localities because the program’s guarantee (the FMR) is not the
same everywhere in real terms.
For the overwhelming majority of recipients of housing assistance, the
magnitude of the housing subsidy received by a household is a decreasing
function of its earned income for small changes in earned income. For oth-
ers, it is independent of earned income. Therefore, it seems plausible that
the standard assumptions of economic theory together with the assump-
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40. Within a project, the income cutoﬀ was diﬀerent for households occupying apartments
of diﬀerent sizes.
41. See footnote 6.tion that leisure is a normal good would imply that each recipient would
work less as a result of the program.
Schone (1992) has shown that this intuition is incorrect for a program
such as public housing that oﬀers a household a speciﬁed apartment for
ar e nt that is proportional to its earned income. She does this by produc-
ing a counterexample that involves no peculiar assumptions about prefer-
ences or the budget space of the household oﬀered a public housing unit.
As usual, this theoretical ambiguity is a result of the nonlinearities of the
budget frontier. Since the axioms of the theory of consumer choice do not
have an implication concerning the qualitative eﬀect of low-income hous-
ing programs on labor earnings, we must rely on empirical studies of this
eﬀect.
In the seminal study of the labor supply eﬀects of means-tested housing
programs, Murray (1980) estimated that public housing induces tenants to
reduce their labor earnings by about 4 percent. Since his study predated
data on the hours worked by participants in housing programs and infor-
mation about multiple program participation, many highly restrictive as-
sumptions were required to make this estimate. First, Murray assumed that
leisure is separable from produced goods in household preferences. Many
utility functions used in empirical research have this property. Second, he
relied on a utility function deﬁned over leisure and a composite of pro-
duced goods that was estimated ignoring all nonlinearities in budget fron-
tiers and all diﬀerences in market prices facing households living in diﬀer-
ent localities. It also ignored diﬀerences in tastes for leisure versus
produced goods across diﬀerent households, thereby ignoring selection
bias. Participants in housing programs may have a diﬀerent taste for leisure
from others. Third, in estimating the subutility function deﬁned over hous-
ing and other produced goods, he ignored the other in-kind subsidies for
which public housing participants were eligible. However, he did allow for
diﬀerences in taste based on certain observed characteristics of house-
holds, and he did account for the possibility that public housing tenants
have stronger than average tastes for housing by using data on these house-
holds immediately prior to entering the program to estimate the subutility
function.
Since the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), it has
been possible (although extremely diﬃcult) to estimate household prefer-
ences accounting for many of the nonlinearities in budget frontiers that re-
sult from government programs and to predict the eﬀects of changes in the
parameters of these programs in a way that avoids selection bias. In the
most important published attempt to estimate the work disincentive eﬀects
of housing assistance, Keane and Moﬃtt (1998) estimate a model of labor
supply and program participation for female heads of household who are
eligible for AFDC, food stamps, and housing assistance. They model Med-
icaid as a beneﬁt automatically received by all participants in AFDC and
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is then used to predict the eﬀects of a wide variety of changes in the welfare
system.
The treatment of housing assistance is the most problematic part of their
analysis. Since estimation is extremely challenging without disaggregation
of produced goods into housing and other produced goods, they did not do
it. However, they recognized that housing subsidies, unlike food stamps,
are worth much less to many recipients than cash grants in the amount of
the subsidy. They also recognized that housing subsidies are not entitle-
ments and that many households that want to participate are not oﬀered
assistance. Keane and Moﬃtt attempted to capture these aspects of reality
by assuming that each household could choose to participate in a program
that would provide them with a cash grant equal to an unknown fraction
of the diﬀerence between the local fair market rent under the Section 8 Cer-
tiﬁcate/Voucher Program for a household with its characteristics and 30
percent of its adjusted income. That is, housing assistance was treated as
an entitlement negative income tax whose known parameters are parame-
ters of the Section 8 Certiﬁcate/Voucher Program. However, they judged
the results based on this speciﬁcation to be so implausible that they aban-
doned this approach and reestimated the model treating the housing sub-
sidy as an exogenous component of nonlabor income for participants with-
out attempting to explain housing program participation.
Estimation of the work disincentive eﬀects of housing programs requires
data on consumption of leisure, housing, and other produced goods for a
random sample of households and the parameters of their budget spaces.
Ignoring the possibility that the household alters its behavior to aﬀect the
probability that it will be oﬀered housing assistance, the information miss-
ing from the SIPP that precludes estimation of preferences in a straight-
forward manner is whether a household that is not receiving housing as-
sistance was oﬀered it during the period under consideration and what
housing assistance was oﬀered. For example, was the household oﬀered a
Section 8 voucher? Was it oﬀered a particular public housing unit, and
what were the characteristics of that unit? (Even without this detailed in-
formation on what the household was oﬀered, it would be possible to
proceed based on a knowledge of which households rejected oﬀers and
approximations of the oﬀer.) Accounting for the possibility that the house-
hold alters its behavior to aﬀect the probability that it will be selected to
participate in a housing program would require a model of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty and a model of administrative selection.42
The best study of the work disincentive eﬀect of a housing program is
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42. Crews (1995) has developed a model of administrative selection to study the eﬀects of
housing programs on the consumption of produced goods, treating labor earnings as exoge-
nous.also one of the most sophisticated econometric studies of the labor supply
eﬀects of any government program. In this study, Schone (1994) uses data
from the SIPP to estimate the distribution of preferences deﬁned over
leisure, housing, and other produced goods for a population of female-
headed households. These estimates account for many of the nonlinearities
in the budget frontier resulting from eligibility for AFDC, food stamps,
public housing, federal and state income taxes, and Social Security taxes.
(She deleted households who are assisted by other housing programs from
the sample because the speciﬁc program was not identiﬁed and hence she
could not describe the household’s budget frontier.) She then uses these es-
timates to predict the eﬀects of several changes in policy. She estimates that
the combined eﬀect of AFDC, food stamps, and public housing is to re-
duce the labor supply of female-headed households by 42 percent and to
increase their consumption of housing by 18 percent (Schone 1994, table
7). Table 6.16 reproduces her table 8. It shows that cashing out housing
programs—that is, eliminating housing programs and adding the housing
subsidy to the AFDC guarantee of the participants in these programs—
will increase the labor supply of these households only 2 percent but will
reduce their consumption of housing 33 percent.
One assumption underlying these estimates is that households who did
not receive housing assistance during the last quarter of 1984 were not
oﬀered housing assistance during that period. Since it is certainly not the
case that all households who are oﬀered housing assistance accept it, this
assumption is violated. For example, Kennedy and Finkel (1994) found
that 13 percent of the households oﬀered Section 8 vouchers and certiﬁ-
cates in the early 1990s did not use them. The ﬁgure was 27 percent in the
mid-1980s (Leger and Kennedy 1990). (Similar ﬁgures for public housing
and subsidized privately owned projects are not available.) However, since
turnover in housing programs is low and the number of assisted house-
holds was not increasing rapidly at this time, it is safe to say that only a
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Original Program Housing Housing
Participation Combination N Baseline Cashed Out Baseline Cashed Out
Public housing only 23 26.28 27.95 399.88 283.51
Public housing, AFDC 2 0.98 0 492.46 230.53
Public housing, food stamps 10 8.57 6.42 356.95 242.15
All programs 39 0 0 394.44 259.14
All public housing recipients 74 9.35 9.56 393.71 263.65
Source: Schone (1994, table 8).minute fraction of Schone’s sample declined an oﬀer of housing assistance
during the last quarter of 1984.
Of course, some households surely declined to apply for housing assis-
tance based on the cost of participation broadly conceived and their per-
ceptions of the likelihood of being chosen to participate in each program
and, in the case of project-based assistance, the likelihood of being oﬀered
particular units. Modeling the decision to apply may enable us to estimate
the distribution of taste parameters in the population with less bias and
more precision. Two problems in implementing this approach are that few
databases contain information on whether a household is on a waiting list
for housing assistance and waiting lists are frequently closed to additional
applicants. Therefore, it is incorrect to conclude that households that are
not on the waiting list do not want to participate. Furthermore, many
households on the waiting list decline the oﬀer to participate in the pro-
gram.
6.4.5 Mean Beneﬁt and Subsidy
Since many economists are interested in the extent to which housing
subsidies diﬀer from lump-sum grants, many studies compare the recipient
beneﬁt and the subsidy. The most common measure of recipient beneﬁt
used in studies of housing programs is the equivalent variation, that is, the
lump-sum grant that is just as satisfactory to the recipient as the housing
program. The subsidy is the excess of the market rent of the unit occupied
over the rent paid by the tenant.43 Since most housing programs change
budget spaces in ways very diﬀerent from lump-sum grants, we certainly
expect any satisfactory measure of beneﬁt to be less than the subsidy for al-
most all participants. In other words, we expect almost every household to
consume a diﬀerent bundle of goods than it would choose if it were given a
cash grant equal to its subsidy. Therefore, the mean beneﬁt should be less
than the mean subsidy.
Table 6.17 contains the results of seven studies that estimate both the
mean beneﬁt and mean subsidy for one of the four programs or for the en-
tire system of housing subsidies. Estimated beneﬁts are based on estimated
indiﬀerence maps or equivalently estimated Marshallian demand func-
tions.
Clearly, there are few estimates for programs other than public housing,
and there are no recent estimates for any program or for the system as a
whole. The median of the estimated ratios of mean beneﬁt to mean subsidy
for public housing is .76, and 70 percent of the estimated ratios are between
.71 and .81. Based on one study apiece, the ratio is between .63 and .77 for
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43. The subsidy is less than the taxpayer cost due to administrative costs and the excess of
nonadministrative cost over market rent under most programs discussed in section 6.4.1.
From the viewpoint of measuring the extent of the consumption distortion, beneﬁt is best
compared with the subsidy rather than taxpayer cost.Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation, .83 for tenant-
based Section 8 Existing, and .61 for the system as a whole. In assessing the
signiﬁcance of these results for public policy, it is important to realize that
mean recipient beneﬁt will be less than the mean subsidy for any success-
ful housing program.
6.4.6 Distribution of Beneﬁts
Many taxpayers care about how beneﬁts are distributed across recipi-
ents of housing assistance. They are interested in how mean beneﬁt varies
with household characteristics and the variance in beneﬁt among house-
holds with the same characteristics. This section explains why little can be
said about these matters based on economic theory, and it describes the re-
sults of empirical research.
Little can be said on the basis of the program’s rules and the general as-
sumptions of economic theory about how mean beneﬁt will vary with
household characteristics under any of the programs even within a single
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Table 6.17 Ratio of Mean Beneﬁt to Mean Subsidy
Location Year Measure Sample Ratio
Public housing
Olsen and Barton (1983) New York City 1965 EV 1366 0.77
Olsen and Barton (1983) New York City 1968 EV 1515 0.73
Murray (1975) 7 cities 1968 EV 1388
Cobb-Douglas 0.81
CES 0.84
Kraft and Olsen (1977) Boston, Pittsburgh,  1972 EV 333 0.73
St. Louis, San Francisco, 
Washington, D.C.





Hammond (1987) National 1977 EV 804 0.64
Section 8 New Construction
Schwab (1985) 13 metro areas 1979 CV 167
Log-linear H expenditure  0.63
function
Linear H expenditure  0.77
function
Section 8 Existing (tenant-based)
Reeder (1985) National 1976 EV 1,099 0.83
All programs
Hammond (1987) National 1977 EV 1,088 0.61
Notes: EV = equivalent variation; CES = constant elasticity of substitution; CV = compensating varia-
tion; SMSA = standard metropolitan statistical area.locality. Since larger households are entitled to larger apartments under
the programs considered, the subsidy will be greater for larger households
on this account. However, since larger units under new construction pro-
grams may typically be in worse condition or in worse neighborhoods than
smaller units, they are not necessarily better overall. Therefore, the mean
subsidy is not necessarily greater for larger households. The certiﬁcate and
voucher programs provide a larger maximum subsidy to larger households
within a locality. However, if larger households experience a larger con-
sumption distortion than smaller households, they could receive a smaller
beneﬁt even though they receive a larger subsidy.
Similarly, the design of housing programs does not insure that mean
beneﬁt will vary with household income within a locality in a particular
manner. For all units under many project-based housing programs and
many units under the rest, the rent that the tenant pays varies directly with
income among households of the same size. Therefore, if all households of
a particular size served by a program lived in apartments with the same
market rent, the subsidy would be larger for the poorest households of that
size. Under all variants of tenant-based Section 8, the maximum subsidy
varies inversely with income among households of the same size. However,
it is far from the truth that all households served by a mature construction
program (that is, a construction program that has been in existence for
many years) occupy housing with the same real market rent. Furthermore,
a larger subsidy does not imply a larger beneﬁt. If poorer households ex-
perience a larger consumption distortion than richer households, they
could receive a smaller beneﬁt even though they receive a larger subsidy.
Table 6.18 summarizes the results of regressions of estimated beneﬁt on
household characteristics in which a linear relationship between mean
beneﬁt and income, family size, age, race, and other characteristics are as-
sumed.44 Some results are consistent across the studies. In public housing,
tenant-based Section 8, and the system as a whole, the mean beneﬁt is
larger for poorer households that are the same with respect to other char-
acteristics. Similarly, mean beneﬁt is larger for larger households. These re-
sults continue to hold when the authors allow for the possibility of a non-
monotonic relationship by including income and family size squared. The
results are less consistent for race and age of the head of the household.
The coeﬃcients have diﬀerent signs in diﬀerent studies, they are often sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant, and the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients indicate small
diﬀerences in mean beneﬁt among otherwise similar households who diﬀer
in these respects.
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44. Except for Kraft and Olsen, all of the studies used real beneﬁt and income in their analy-
ses. That is, they divided money beneﬁt and income by a cross-sectional price index. Since
Kraft and Olsen’s study is based on data for ﬁve of the country’s largest metropolitan areas, it
is not clear that taking account of overall diﬀerences in prices would have had much eﬀect on
their results.Two other noteworthy results emerged from these analyses. First, when
Murray (1975) included dummy variables for the diﬀerent cities repre-
sented in his data in the regression equation, he found substantial diﬀer-
ences in the real mean beneﬁt of public housing for households with the
same characteristics living in diﬀerent urban areas. In her study of public
housing and the entire system of housing subsidies, Hammond (1987) also
found substantial diﬀerences in real mean beneﬁt for otherwise similar
households living in diﬀerent regions and in places with diﬀerent degrees
of urbanization. Reeder (1985) found large diﬀerences in the real mean
beneﬁt of the Section 8 Existing Housing Program between otherwise sim-
ilar households living in expensive and inexpensive locations. Second,
when Reeder included in the regression equation a measure of the house-
hold’s taste for housing based on its preprogram housing consumption, he
found that households with the strongest taste received the largest beneﬁt
from the Section 8 Existing Program.
6.4.7 Participation Rates
Since taxpayers with any interest in helping low-income households are
more interested in helping some types of households than others, informa-
tion on participation rates of diﬀerent types of households is useful for dis-
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Table 6.18 Distribution of Beneﬁts Among Program Recipients
Income Family Size Black Age SE/Beneﬁt Sample
Public housing
Olsen and Barton (1983), 1965 –** +** — — 0.38 1,366
Olsen and Barton (1983), 1968 –** +** — — 0.43 1,515
Murray (1975) – + +** +** 1,388
Kraft and Olsen (1977) –** +** –** –** 0.93 333
Hammond (1987) –** +** — +** 0.89 804
Section 8 Existing (tenant-based)
Reeder (1985) –** +** — + 0.42 1,099
All programs
Hammond (1987) –** +** + +** 1.23 1,088
Notes: This table summarizes the results from multiple regression analyses in several articles. In each
case, the beneﬁt is regressed on the variables presented in the ﬁrst four columns and other variables.
Olsen-Barton and Kraft-Olsen included sex of the head of the household; Hammond included sex and
education of the head and dummy variables for region of the country and size of the locality; and Reeder
included dummy variables for sex of the head, other minority, and nonmetropolitan residence as well as
an overall price index and the squares of income and family size. In Murray, age is a dummy variable that
indicates whether the head is 62 years or older. Murray also includes dummy variables for diﬀerent
household compositions rather than a single variable for family size. The signs presented in the table in-
dicate whether mean beneﬁt varies directly (+) or inversely (–) with the household characteristic. The
ﬁfth column presents the standard deviation of the error term divided by the mean beneﬁt, as a measure
of the amount of variation present. Finally, the last column gives the number of observations used in the
regression.
*The coeﬃcient was statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.cussions of housing policy. This section summarizes the evidence on this
matter.
Reeder (1985, table 6) presents the percentage of households in each in-
come and family size class who participate in any HUD program in 1977.
The highest participation rate in any of the seventy-seven classes was less
than 25 percent. The regularities are that, for any family size, the partici-
pation rate ﬁrst rises and then falls as income increases. For unknown rea-
sons, the poorest households of each size have very low participation rates.
Within each income class, participation rates are highest for one-person
households, reﬂecting the strong preference received by the elderly in hous-
ing programs.
Wallace et al. (1981, ﬁgure S-3 and table 2-8) compare the fraction of el-
igible households and participants in the Section 8 Existing and New Con-
struction programs with particular characteristics. These comparisons do
not hold other characteristics constant. For Section 8 Existing they ﬁnd
that in 1979 the percentage of participants who were elderly was about the
same as the percentage of eligibles in this category, that minorities were a
slightly larger fraction of participants than eligibles, and very low-income
households were a noticeably larger fraction of participants than eli-
gibles.45 For Section 8 New Construction, the elderly, whites, females, and
small families were greatly overrepresented in the sense that they were a
higher fraction of participants than eligibles.
Olsen and Barton (1983, 325) use a linear probability model to estimate
how the participation rate in public housing in New York City in 1965 and
1968 varied with the household’s income and size and with the age, race,
and sex of the head of the household. (At that time, public housing ac-
counted for almost all subsidized housing for the poor in the city.) The
most striking ﬁnding is that blacks had a much higher participation rate
(about 20 percentage points) than whites with the same other characteris-
tics. No attempt has been made to determine the explanation for this ﬁnd-
ing. Participation also increased noticeably with family size (about 4 per-
centage points per person).
In her attempt to account for both self- and administrative selection in
estimating the preferences of recipients of housing subsidies and the bene-
ﬁts that they receive from housing programs, Crews (1995) used data from
the eleven metropolitan areas in the 1987 American Housing Survey to es-
timate a probit model explaining whether a household receives housing as-
sistance. Her explanatory variables reﬂect participation costs broadly con-
ceived and the factors involved in the preference systems of housing
authorities. She found that the poorest households, nonwhites, food stamp
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45. Recall that in HUD’s terminology very low-income households are not necessarily
poor. A family of four is considered to have a very low income if its income is less than 50 per-
cent of the local median.and welfare participants, and the unemployed had higher participation
rates that were statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The elderly
have a much higher participation rate that is statistically signiﬁcant at the
5 percent level.
6.4.8 Market Prices
It is often argued that housing programs will have eﬀects on the rents of
unsubsidized units with speciﬁed characteristics throughout the housing
market. For example, it has been argued that housing vouchers will lead to
a higher demand and hence higher rents for units that just meet the stan-
dards of the housing program and lower demand and hence lower rents for
the worst units because these units will be abandoned by households who
receive vouchers. This argument is certainly well founded on economic the-
ory, at least in the short run. Others argue that new construction programs
will lead to lower prices for existing apartments. If the new construction
comes as a complete surprise to private suppliers, this is also a clear impli-
cation of standard economic theory. However, if the new construction un-
der the program is completely anticipated by private suppliers, the oppo-
site eﬀect is to be expected. To the extent that subsidized construction
programs lead to greater production of housing, they drive up the prices of
inputs that are most important in the production of housing and thereby
increase the cost of producing housing with any speciﬁed characteristics.
With the exception of Susin (2002), there are no studies of the eﬀects of
any of the programs under consideration on market rents of units with a
given set of characteristics.46 NBER and Urban Institute simulation mod-
els have been used to study the eﬀects of hypothetical programs bearing
some resemblance to the programs under consideration (De Leeuw and
Struyk 1975; Kain 1981). The Housing Allowance Supply Experiment did
study the eﬀect on market prices of an entitlement housing voucher pro-
gram similar to the Section 8 voucher program in operation between 1983
and 1999. This study found little eﬀect on the market rents of units of any
type (Barnett and Lowry 1979; Mills and Sullivan 1981; Rydell, Neels, and
Barnett 1982). For units that were signiﬁcantly below standards prior to
the experiment, rents fell. For modest units meeting the standards or
falling slightly below them, rents rose. If an entitlement housing allowance
program for which 20 percent of households were eligible had no dis-
cernible eﬀect on housing prices, it is perhaps reasonable to conclude that
existing tenant-based programs have little eﬀect.
Susin (2002) reports results inconsistent with this conclusion and with
the implications of standard economic theory. Since vouchers induce re-
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46. Studies of the eﬀects of housing programs on the rents of units in the immediate neigh-
borhoods of subsidized housing deal with a diﬀerent issue. These studies measure the magni-
tude of nonpecuniary external eﬀects rather than market eﬀects due to changes in the pattern
of demand and supply.cipients to vacate the worst housing and occupy housing in the middle of
the quality distribution, this program should decrease rents of the worst
apartments and increase rents of units of average quality. Susin ﬁnds that
unsubsidized poor households in metropolitan areas with more vouchers
per poor household pay higher rents for units that are the same with re-
spect to many observed housing characteristics.
To obtain this result, he ﬁrst uses data from the 1993 National American
Housing Survey to estimate a hedonic regression explaining the rent of un-
subsidized apartments as a function of housing characteristics and dummy
variables for combinations of metropolitan area and income group, for ex-
ample, the poorest households in Oakland.47 He interprets diﬀerences in
the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables for a particular type of household
across metropolitan areas as reﬂecting diﬀerences in the price of identical
housing.48 For each of the three income classes separately, he regresses
these estimated coeﬃcients on the number of vouchers per poor household
and a few other potential determinants of the price of identical units.
The reason for the discrepancy between Susin’s ﬁndings and the impli-
cations of the usual theoretical argument about the eﬀects of vouchers on
rents is not clear. His results concerning the diﬀerences across income
groups in the rents of units with the same observed characteristics in the
same metropolitan area suggest the importance of unobserved character-
istics. He ﬁnds that households with higher incomes consistently pay
higher rents. The only plausible explanation for this result is that richer
households living in apartments that are the same with respect to observed
characteristics occupy units that are better with respect to unobserved
characteristics. So one possible explanation for Susin’s puzzling result is
that unobserved housing characteristics are correlated with the number of
vouchers per poor household. Since assertions about the eﬀects of diﬀer-
ent types of housing programs on market prices are inﬂuential in discus-
sions of housing policy, additional studies of this question are important.
6.4.9 Tangible External Beneﬁts
Many of the alleged tangible external beneﬁts and costs of particular
types of housing program would accrue to neighbors of subsidized house-
holds. To the extent that they existed, these external beneﬁts and costs
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47. The division of the population into thirds is not based entirely on income, but it is based
on household rather than housing characteristics. This is important because the theory ex-
plaining the market eﬀects of housing vouchers divides the housing market based on housing
characteristics. Most importantly, it distinguishes between units that do and do not meet the
program’s housing standards. It is important to realize that many households in the lowest
third of the income distribution live in units in the middle third of the housing desirability dis-
tribution. Many households in the middle third of the income distribution live in units in the
lowest third of the housing desirability distribution.
48. Susin (2002, 126) recognizes the importance of unobserved housing characteristics, but
this does not aﬀect his procedures or interpretation of results.would be reﬂected in neighboring property values. Although the oldest
study of this matter was conducted more than forty years ago, there have
been relatively few studies over the years.49 Until recently, these studies
have usually been limited to a small number of projects in one city or based
on crude methods and data. Recent advances in software for analyzing ge-
ographical data have led to several detailed analyses based on data on sales
of all unsubsidized single-family units and the location of all subsidized
households or projects in several large metropolitan areas.
Lee, Culhane, and Wachter (1999) studied the eﬀects of all major urban
rental-housing programs.50 They ﬁnd small positive eﬀects on neighboring
property values on average for some programs and small negative eﬀects
for others. Galster, Tatian, and Smith (1999) ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects of the occupancy of units by recipients of Section 8 certiﬁcates and
vouchers on neighborhood property values. The direction of the eﬀect de-
pends on the nature of the neighborhood and the concentration of pro-
gram participants in the neighborhood, and the magnitudes are relatively
small.
6.4.10 Other Issues
One of the most active areas of research on housing policy over the past
few years has been the eﬀect of oﬀering vouchers to occupants of public or
private subsidized projects located in central city neighborhoods with high
concentrations of poverty on the condition that they move to low-poverty
neighborhoods. This research is based on data from HUD’s Moving to Op-
portunity (MTO) Demonstration Program that has been in operation
since 1994 in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. El-
igible participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: those
who received a Section 8 voucher on the condition that they occupy a unit
in a census tract with a poverty rate of less than 10 percent as well as ad-
hering to the other program requirements, those who received regular Sec-
tion 8 vouchers, and those who continued to receive their current project-
based assistance. Households in the ﬁrst group receive counseling and
assistance in ﬁnding a private unit, and the experiment was not designed to
estimate the eﬀect of this intervention separately from other aspects of the
oﬀer.
Although the MTO Demonstration aﬀects few households (about
1,300), its carefully controlled experimental design should permit deﬁni-
tive answers to the main questions posed. The research to date indicates
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49. See Galster, Tatian, and Smith (1999) for a review of the literature.
50. They incorrectly assume that the FHA-assisted units in their data are owner-occupied
units. In fact, these are units in privately owned subsidized rental projects under programs
such as Section 221(d)(3) and 236 whose mortgages are insured by the FHA. Therefore, their
conclusions about the eﬀect of homeownership programs on neighboring property values is
not supported by their results.that oﬀering households Section 8 vouchers on the condition that they
move to low-poverty neighborhoods (combined with assistance in ﬁnding
a unit) reduces welfare dependency by adults and violent crimes by
teenagers in recipient households and increases the educational attain-
ment of younger children in these households. They are also less likely to
be the victims of crimes or suﬀer injuries or asthma attacks (Katz, Kling,
and Liebman 2001; Ludwig, Ladd, and Duncan 2001). Kling’s web page
(http://www.wws.Princeton.EDU/~kling/mto/) contains a comprehensive
account of the experiment and research based on it.
Other important issues dealt with in the literature on housing policy are
the extent to which subsidized new construction reduces unsubsidized con-
struction (Murray 1983, 1999), the eﬀect of subsidized housing on home-
lessness (Early 1998), the eﬀect of living in public housing on the educa-
tional attainment of children and their earnings as adults (Currie and
Yelowitz 2000; Newman and Harkness 2002), and the eﬀect of public hous-
ing waiting lists on intra-urban mobility (Painter 1997). The former is par-
ticularly important because erroneous views about this matter contribute
importantly to bad policy.
6.4.11 Experimental Housing Allowance Program
No discussion of housing policy research would be complete without
some mention of the Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP).
The major goals of EHAP were to determine the market eﬀects of an enti-
tlement program of tenant-based housing assistance and the eﬀects of var-
ious types of such assistance on household choices. Congress authorized
this program in 1970, planning for the experiment occurred in the early
1970s, data were collected during the mid-1970s, and the ﬁnal reports were
completed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The experiment cost almost
$200 million (that is, more than $500 million in 2000 prices); research and
data collection accounted for almost half of this amount.51 The research
ﬁrms that ran the experiments issued more than 300 reports, technical
notes, and professional papers. As a result of these expenditures, we know
more about the eﬀects of the experimental programs studied than any es-
tablished housing program.
The experiment had four components: the Supply Experiment, the De-
mand Experiment, the Administrative Agency Experiment, and the Inte-
grated Analysis. The ﬁrst two were the largest and most important.
The primary purposes of the Supply Experiment were to determine the
market eﬀects of an entitlement program of household-based assistance,
such as its eﬀects on the rents of units with speciﬁed characteristics and
how suppliers alter their units in response to the program. The Supply Ex-
periment research still accounts for the bulk of what is known about these
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51. Sadly, HUD lost all of the data that had been so carefully collected and documented.matters. The RAND Corporation conducted the Supply Experiment. The
experiment involved operating entitlement housing allowance programs in
the Green Bay and South Bend metropolitan areas. At the time of the ex-
periment, Green Bay had few minorities and a very low vacancy rate.
South Bend had a large minority population and a high vacancy rate.
About 20 percent of the households in each area were eligible for housing
assistance. Unlike established housing programs, both renters and home-
owners could participate. These households were oﬀered a cash grant on
the condition that they occupy housing meeting certain standards. These
payments could continue for up to ten years provided that the household
remained eligible.
The Demand Experiment, conducted by Abt Associates in the Pitts-
burgh and Phoenix metropolitan areas, was primarily intended to see how
recipients would respond to diﬀerent types of household-based housing
assistance and, for a given type, to diﬀerent program parameters. To this
end, eligible households were assigned at random to the diﬀerent programs
or to a control group that was paid a small amount of money to provide
needed information. One type of housing assistance oﬀered eligible house-
holds a cash grant under the condition that they occupy housing meeting
certain standards, another oﬀered a cash grant under the condition that
they spend at least a certain amount on housing (two diﬀerent amounts
were tested), and another oﬀered the same cash grant with no strings at-
tached. Two other plans oﬀered to pay diﬀerent fractions of the house-
hold’s housing expenditure with no other strings attached. Since the De-
mand Experiment provided subsidies for only three years and large
changes in housing consumption have a large ﬁxed-cost component, the
Demand Experiment results undoubtedly understate the responsiveness to
a permanent program (Bradbury and Downs 1981, 367–68).
The most inﬂuential Demand Experiment research went beyond a com-
parison of diﬀerent types of household-based assistance. It compared the
eﬀects of the minimum-standards housing allowance program with the
major established housing programs in existence at the time, namely public
housing, Section 236, and Section 23. The results of some of this research
are reported earlier in this paper.
In the Integrated Analysis, the Urban Institute helped to design all of the
experiments and used data from all of the experiments to analyze many of
the same questions considered by the contractors operating the experi-
ments. The Administrative Agency Experiment conducted by Abt Associ-
ates focused on the behavior of local administrative agencies in operating
an allowance program. Unlike the Demand Experiment, it was not a con-
trolled experiment.
The best introductions to this vast literature are the ﬁnal reports of the
Supply Experiment, the Demand Experiment, and the Integrated Analysis
(Lowry 1983; Kennedy 1980; Struyk and Bendick 1981), an edited volume
Housing Programs for Low-Income Households 425containing summaries of the ﬁndings by the major contributors to EHAP
research (Friedman and Weinberg 1983), an edited volume containing
evaluations of this research by outside scholars (Bradbury and Downs
1981), a monograph containing some of the more technical results on con-
sumer behavior from the Demand Experiment (Friedman and Weinberg
1982), and HUD’s 1980 summary report (HUD 1980).
Although it is impossible to present a detailed review of the ﬁndings
here, it is possible to state a few of the most important results for housing
policy. Since the only type of tenant-based housing assistance studied in
EHAP that has been used in an established program is the cash grant con-
ditional on occupying a dwelling meeting certain housing standards, and
both the Supply and the Demand experiments studied this type of pro-
gram, the summary below will focus on it.52
The experiments revealed that many unsubsidized low-income house-
holds live in housing meeting reasonable standards. About half of the eligi-
ble families in the Supply Experiment occupied housing meeting its stan-
dards, and about a fourth of the eligible families in the Demand Experiment
sites occupied housing meeting its more stringent standards prior to receiv-
ing assistance. Even at the lowest income levels, many households occupied
units meeting the standards of the Demand Experiment, which suggests the
importance of preferences in determining whether poor households meet
housing standards. Not surprisingly, households whose units met the stan-
dards prior to the program were much more likely to participate in the min-
imum-standards housing allowance program. They could receive a subsidy
without moving or getting their landlords to improve their apartments.
In estimating the cost of an entitlement housing assistance program, it is
often assumed that all eligible households would participate. The Supply
Experiment revealed that this assumption could be far from the mark. Al-
though the entitlement housing allowance programs in Green Bay and
South Bend were heavily publicized, the participation rate leveled oﬀ at
about a third after three years. It was about 41 percent for eligible renters
and 27 percent for eligible homeowners. The primary reasons for the low
participation rates are easy to understand. Since the subsidy declines lin-
early with income until the upper income limit is reached and the density
of eligible households increases with income, many eligible households
were entitled to small subsidies. Many others who were eligible for some-
what larger subsidies had to move to get them because their apartments
were substantially below the program’s minimum standards. Many house-
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52. The Section 8 Voucher Program implemented in 1983 and currently being phased out is
a program of this type. (See ﬁgure 6.4.) Since this program does not have the same speciﬁc pa-
rameters (housing standards, real guarantee, and beneﬁt reduction rate) as the programs
studied in the experiments, and since participation in the Section 8 Voucher Program depends
importantly on administrative selection, it should not be expected to have the same quantita-
tive eﬀects as the experimental programs. The best sources of information about the eﬀects of
the Voucher Program are the detailed studies commissioned by HUD (Leger and Kennedy
1990; Kennedy and Finkel 1994).holds eligible at a point in time were only brieﬂy eligible. Finally, despite the
heavy publicity, 17 percent of eligible households had not learned about
the program by the end of its third year. Obviously, we should not conclude
that the participation rate in any entitlement minimum-standards housing
allowance program would be a third. This is heavily dependent on the gen-
erosity of the subsidy and the minimum standards. It is possible to have an
expensive entitlement housing allowance program serving a large number
of households or an inexpensive program serving a small number.
The minimum-standards housing allowance program tested in the
Supply and Demand experiments resulted in modest increases in overall
housing consumption as measured by the mean market rent of the units oc-
cupied and a substantial eﬀect in terms of the fraction of eligible house-
holds meeting the program’s minimum standards. Recipients in the Supply
Experiment devoted 80 percent of their increased spending to goods other
than housing. For a slight majority of recipients, the minimum housing
standards were non-binding constraints. So the eﬀect of the program on
the consumption patterns of these households was an income eﬀect alone.
For many others, only modest improvements in their current housing were
necessary to meet the standards. Indeed, the required improvements were
so modest that many renters made them without involving their landlords.
Evidence from the Supply Experiment shows beyond a reasonable
doubt that an entitlement housing allowance program similar to the one
tested will have no signiﬁcant eﬀects on rents of units with speciﬁed char-
acteristics even in the short run. Reasons for the program’s small eﬀect on
rental housing prices are easy to ﬁnd. Eligible families account for only a
small fraction of the demand for housing services in a given housing mar-
ket, and many of these families choose not to participate. So even a large
increase in demand by participants will have a small eﬀect on aggregate de-
mand for housing services, and this small increase occurs gradually over
time because not all families respond instantly to an oﬀer of assistance.53
Furthermore, the Supply Experiment revealed that even over short periods
suppliers are willing to make many changes in existing units in response to
small changes in the proﬁtability of housing with diﬀerent characteristics.
6.5 Reform Options
The major options for reform of the system of housing subsidies to low-
income households are answers to the following questions. Should housing
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53. The response to an oﬀer of housing assistance with minimum housing standards is
surely slower than the response to an oﬀer of assistance for most other goods because many
households must substantially renovate their current housing or move in order to receive as-
sistance. Despite this drawback of tenant-based housing assistance of this form, it still gets
households into satisfactory housing much faster than any form of new construction. The lag
between authorization of funds and occupancy under all construction programs is much
greater than the lag under this form of tenant-based assistance.assistance be an entitlement? Should housing subsidies be delivered to ad-
ditional households by building new projects under some type of con-
struction or substantial rehabilitation program or by giving them housing
vouchers? Should we require households currently living in subsidized
projects for which future federal expenditure is discretionary to live in
these projects to receive a subsidy and should their owners be given a suﬃ-
cient subsidy to induce them to continue to serve these households, or
should these households be given housing vouchers? This section will con-
sider each of these questions.
Unlike other major means-tested transfer programs, housing assistance
is not an entitlement, despite its stated goal of “a decent home and suitable
living environment for every American family” (Housing Act of 1949). No
coherent justiﬁcation for this feature of the system of housing subsidies has
been oﬀered. That is, no one has attempted to explain why we should oﬀer
assistance to some but not other households with the same characteristics.
It is diﬃcult to reconcile these features of the Section 8 Existing Housing
Program and all other low-income housing programs with plausible tax-
payer preferences. In thinking about whether housing assistance should be
an entitlement, it is helpful to think about how a nonrecipient who pays the
taxes to support housing programs feels about dividing a ﬁxed amount of
assistance between two families that are identical in his or her eyes. At one
extreme, we could give one of the families all of the money. At the other ex-
treme, we could divide it equally between them. The former is inconsistent,
and the latter consistent, with the usual assumptions about preferences,
namely, that the amount that a person is willing to sacriﬁce for an additional
unit of anything of value decreases as its quantity increases. To say that two
potential recipients are the same in the eyes of a taxpayer is to say that the
taxpayer is willing to sacriﬁce the same amount for the same change in the
consumption pattern of either family. If all housing assistance goes to one
potential recipient, the value to the taxpayer of the change in the consump-
tion bundle resulting from the last dollar of housing assistance received by
this recipient will be less than that resulting from the ﬁrst dollar of housing
assistance to the other recipient. Therefore, the taxpayer’s well-being can be
increased by reallocating housing assistance until both potential recipients
receive the same assistance. Although each recipient would like to have
more than half of the total, this obviously provides no guidance for policy.
The usual argument against making housing assistance an entitlement is
that it would be too expensive. Those who make this argument seem to
have in mind delivering housing assistance to all currently eligible house-
holds using the current mix of housing programs and the current rules for
the tenant’s contribution to rent. This would indeed increase the amount
spent on housing assistance greatly, although this magnitude has not been
estimated. However, we do not have to make more than 40 percent of the
population eligible for housing assistance; we can reduce the fraction of
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and we can reduce subsidies at every income level. Indeed, U.S. housing
policy has been moving in this direction as a result of, ﬁrst, a series of
amendments of the 1937 Housing Act that required an increasing percent-
age of households served by tenant-based assistance to be the poorest of
the currently eligible households; second, the introduction and rapid ex-
pansion of the cost-eﬀective tenant-based Section 8 Program authorized
by the 1974 Housing Act; and, third, the increase in the tenant contribu-
tion to rent mandated by the Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1981. Each of these reforms moved us in the direction of
an entitlement program.
Furthermore, it is easy to develop an entitlement housing assistance
program with any cost desired. For example, we could have an entitlement
housing assistance program without spending any additional money by a
simple change in the Section 8 Voucher Program, namely reducing the sub-
sidy available to each eligible household by the same amount. This will
eﬀectively eliminate from the program all households currently eligible for
subsidies smaller than this amount. These are the currently eligible house-
holds with the largest incomes. This would free up money to provide
vouchers to poorer households who want to participate. The reduction in
subsidies to those who continue to participate would free up money to pro-
vide vouchers to households with identical characteristics who had not
previously been served. At current subsidy levels, many more people want
to participate than can be served with the existing budget. As we reduced
the subsidy at each income level, the number of households that are eligi-
ble for a subsidy and willing to participate would decline until we reached
a point where all households who wanted to participate in the program
were participating. So without any change in the program’s budget, we
could create an entitlement housing assistance program serving the poor-
est of the currently eligible households. If reductions in the subsidies re-
ceived by current participants seem too draconian, we could phase in the
new system by freezing subsidies at current levels and allowing inﬂation to
erode real subsidy levels.
In discussions of housing policy, a common objection to this proposal is
that no one would be able to ﬁnd housing meeting the program’s standards
with the lower subsidies. Obviously, this objection is logically ﬂawed. We
start from a position where many more people want to participate than can
be served with the existing budget. If we reduce subsidy levels slightly, it
will still be the case that more people want to participate than can be
served. If we decrease the subsidy levels so much that no one wants to par-
ticipate, we have decreased them more than the proposed amounts.
A more sophisticated argument against the proposal is that the poorest
households will be unable to participate in the proposed program. The
simple proposal above calls for reducing the guarantee under the Voucher
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household with no income. If the Payment Standard is less than the rent re-
quired to occupy a unit meeting the program’s minimum housing stan-
dards, then a household whose income and assistance from other sources
is just suﬃcient to buy subsistence quantities of other goods would be un-
able to participate in the proposed Voucher Program. Previous studies
(Olsen and Reeder 1983; Cutts and Olsen 2002) have shown that the Pay-
ment Standard exceeds the market rent of units just meeting the program’s
minimum housing standards in all of the many metropolitan areas and
bedroom sizes studied. The median excess varied between 33 and 80 per-
cent between 1975 and 1993. So a considerable reduction in the payment
standard could occur almost everywhere without precluding participation
by the poorest of the poor. However, the preceding proposal might lead to
a particularly low participation rate by these households. This could be
counteracted by a smaller reduction in the guarantee combined with a
greater beneﬁt reduction rate. For a given program budget, this would yield
a higher participation rate by the poorest of the poor and a lower partici-
pation rate by other eligible households.
Another objection to the proposed program is that participants in the re-
vised Section 8 Voucher Program would receive much smaller subsidies
than the majority of identical households receiving project-based assis-
tance, thereby introducing additional inequities into the system of housing
subsidies. This objection could be overcome by increasing the tenant con-
tribution under the programs of project-based assistance and using the sav-
ings from the reduced subsidies under these programs to increase the bud-
get of the Voucher Program. If this were done, subsidies under the Voucher
Program would not have to be reduced as much to make it an entitlement
program, and hence the program’s participation rate would be higher.
Should housing subsidies be delivered to additional households by
building new projects under some type of construction or substantial re-
habilitation program or by giving them housing vouchers?
The unanimity of the evidence on the cost-eﬀectiveness of tenant-based
vouchers compared with any form of project-based assistance studied is a
strong argument for providing vouchers to all additional households re-
ceiving housing assistance, especially because the parameters of a voucher
plan can be altered to change many of its other eﬀects without aﬀecting its
cost-eﬀectiveness or its total cost to taxpayers. For example, if we want to
increase the participation rate of the poorest households at the expense of
other eligible households, we can increase the program’s guarantee (that is,
the Payment Standard) and beneﬁt reduction rate (that is, the tenant con-
tribution as a fraction of adjusted income). Changes in the minimum hous-
ing standards, the payment standard, the beneﬁt reduction rate, and the
upper limit on housing expenditure will also lead to changes in consump-
tion of housing and other goods.
430 Edgar O. OlsenTwo main objections have been raised to exclusive reliance on tenant-
based assistance.54 Speciﬁcally, it has been argued that tenant-based assis-
tance will not work in markets with the lowest vacancy rates and that new
construction programs have an advantage compared with tenant-based as-
sistance that oﬀsets their cost-ineﬀectiveness: Namely, they promote
neighborhood revitalization to a much greater extent.
Taken literally, the ﬁrst argument is clearly incorrect in that Section 8
certiﬁcates and vouchers have been used continuously in all housing mar-
kets for more than two decades. It is true that some households who are
oﬀered vouchers do not ﬁnd such housing within their housing authority’s
time limits. However, other eligible households use these vouchers. For
many years, public housing authorities have over-issued vouchers and
thereby achieved high usage rates despite low success rates. In recent years,
they have had a reserve fund for this purpose, and current regulations call
for penalties on authorities with usage rates below 95 percent. The national
average usage rate is high (about 92 percent). So the overwhelming major-
ity of certiﬁcates and vouchers are in use at each point in time. Local hous-
ing authorities rarely, if ever, return certiﬁcates and vouchers to HUD.
The real issue is not whether tenant-based vouchers can be used in all
market conditions but whether it would be better to use new construction
or substantial rehabilitation programs in some circumstances. In this re-
gard, two questions seem especially important. Will construction pro-
grams get eligible households into satisfactory housing faster than tenant-
based vouchers in some market conditions? Are construction programs
more cost-eﬀective than tenant-based vouchers under some circum-
stances? Although careful studies of these two questions have not been
done, we can be very conﬁdent about the answer to the ﬁrst questions.
Based on existing evidence, there can be little doubt that tenant-based
vouchers get households into satisfactory housing much faster than any
construction program even in the areas where the highest fraction of
vouchers are returned unused. Two major studies of success rates under the
tenant-based Section 8 program have been completed over the past ﬁfteen
years (Leger and Kennedy 1990a; Kennedy and Finkel 1994). These stud-
ies collected data on more than ﬁfty local housing authorities selected at
random. The lowest success rate observed was 33 percent for New York
City in the mid-1980s.55 If a housing authority with this success rate issued
only the vouchers available at each point in time and allowed recipients up
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54. See Weicher (1990) for a more extended discussion of the voucher/production debate.
55. The success rate is the percentage of the households authorized to search for a unit who
occupy a unit meeting the program’s standards within the housing authority’s time limit. The
success rate in New York City in the mid-1980s was much lower than the second lowest (47 per-
cent in Boston in the mid-1980s) and much lower than in New York City in 1993 (65 percent).
An earlier study based on data from the late 1970s found lower success rates. However, at that
time housing authorities were still ﬁguring out how to administer this new program, so these
success rates are of no relevance for predicting the eﬀects of expanding the program today.to three months to ﬁnd a unit meeting the program’s standards, about 80
percent of the vouchers would be in use within a year. If they followed the
current practice of authorizing more households to search for units than
the number of vouchers available, almost all of the vouchers would be in
use in much less than a year.
Based on data on a large stratiﬁed random sample of 800 projects built
between 1975 and 1979, Schnare et al. (1982) found the mean time from ap-
plication for project approval to completion of the project ranged from
twenty-three months for Section 236 to ﬁfty-three months for conventional
public housing. Mean times ranged from twenty-six to thirty-one months
for the variants of the Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Reha-
bilitation Program. Occupancy of the completed units required additional
time. Although the authors did not report results separately for diﬀerent
markets, it seems reasonable to believe that these times were greater in the
tightest housing markets because the demand for unsubsidized construc-
tion would be greatest in these locations. So if Congress were to simulta-
neously authorize an equal number of tenant-based vouchers and units un-
der any construction program, it is clear that all of the vouchers would be
in use long before the ﬁrst newly built unit was occupied no matter what the
condition of the local housing market at the time that the money is appro-
priated.
Although the cost-eﬀectiveness studies discussed in section 6.4 are based
on data for projects built in twenty-ﬁve cities at many diﬀerent times and
these studies are unanimous in ﬁnding that it costs signiﬁcantly more than
a dollar to provide a dollar’s worth of housing under construction pro-
grams such as public housing, Section 236, and Section 8 New Construc-
tion, they do not report results that enable us to determine how the cost-
eﬀectiveness of these programs vary with market conditions. Therefore, we
cannot be certain that vouchers are more cost-eﬀective than construction
programs in all circumstances. Whether there are any market conditions
under which construction programs are more cost-eﬀective than vouchers
is one of the most important unanswered questions in housing policy anal-
ysis.
The second major objection to the exclusive reliance on tenant-based as-
sistance is that new construction promotes neighborhood revitalization to
a much greater extent than tenant-based assistance. The evidence from
EHAP is that even an entitlement housing voucher program will have mod-
est eﬀects on neighborhoods, and the small literature on the Section 8
Voucher Program conﬁrms these ﬁndings for a similar nonentitlement pro-
gram (Lowry 1983, 205–17; Galster, Tatian, and Smith 1999). These pro-
grams result in the upgrading of many existing dwellings, but this is con-
centrated on their interiors. It is plausible to believe that a new subsidized
project built at low density in a neighborhood with the worst housing and
poorest households would make that neighborhood a more attractive
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whether some construction projects lead to neighborhood upgrading. The
issues are the magnitude of neighborhood upgrading across all projects un-
der a program over the life of these projects, who beneﬁts from this up-
grading, and the extent to which upgrading of one neighborhood leads to
the deterioration of other neighborhoods.
Economic theory suggests that the primary beneﬁciaries of neighbor-
hood upgrading will be the owners of nearby properties. Since the over-
whelming majority of the poorest households are renters, it is plausible to
believe that most of the housing surrounding housing projects located in
the poorest neighborhoods is rental. Therefore, if a newly built subsidized
project makes the neighborhood a more attractive place to live, the owners
of this rental housing will charge higher rents and the value of their prop-
erty will be greater. Since the occupants of this rental housing could have
lived in a nicer neighborhood prior to the project by paying a higher rent,
they are hurt by its construction. The poor will beneﬁt from the neighbor-
hood upgrading only to the extent that they own the property surrounding
the project.
Housing programs involving new construction may primarily shift the
location of the worst neighborhoods. With the passage of time, the initial
residents will leave the neighborhood in response to the projects, and oth-
ers who value a better neighborhood more highly will replace them. The
desirability of the neighborhoods into which the original residents move
will decline in response to their weaker demand for neighborhood ameni-
ties. The possibility of a shifting of the locations of the worst neighbor-
hoods has not even been recognized in discussions of housing policy, let
alone studied.
What has been studied is the extent to which projects under various
housing programs aﬀect neighborhood property values. The existing stud-
ies ﬁnd small positive eﬀects on average for some programs and small neg-
ative eﬀects for others (Lee, Culhane, and Wachter 1999; Galster, Tatian,
and Smith 1999). No study ﬁnds substantial positive eﬀects on average for
any program.
Should we require households currently living in subsidized projects for
which future federal expenditure is discretionary to live in these projects to
receive a subsidy and their owners to be given a suﬃcient subsidy to induce
them to continue to serve these households, or should these households be
given housing vouchers?
HUD devotes a substantial fraction of its budget for housing assistance
to discretionary expenditures that provide additional subsidies to public
housing authorities and the owners of privately owned subsidized projects
in an attempt to insure that their projects provide satisfactory housing
without charging rents that are regarded as excessive. For example, more
than $6 billion annually is spent on operating and modernization subsidies
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have been in existence for more than twenty years receive similar subsidies.
Given the evidence on the cost-eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent methods of deliv-
ering housing assistance, an obvious policy reform is to replace these dis-
cretionary expenditures with tenant-based vouchers.
In the case of public housing, this reform would involve using the money
currently devoted to operating and modernization subsidies to oﬀer public
housing tenants vouchers that can be used in private or public housing.56
At present, if tenants leave public housing, they lose their subsidies, so
housing authorities have a captive audience. Under the proposed reform,
housing authorities would be forced to compete with the private sector for
tenants, albeit with the considerable advantage of having been given their
projects.
To oﬀset this large reduction in revenue and enable housing authorities
to raise the money to continue to provide housing that meets program stan-
dards, they could be allowed to charge market rents for the units vacated
after the implementation of the reform. Households with tenant-based
vouchers would occupy many of these units. Other households eligible for
housing assistance would occupy the rest. Public housing tenants who re-
jected vouchers would be able to remain in their apartments on the previ-
ous terms.
Housing authorities could raise additional money by taking advantage
of the current regulation that allows them to sell projects. At present, they
have little incentive to do it. Without guaranteed federal operating and
modernization subsidies, many of the larger authorities may well decide to
sell their worst projects. These are projects that will be largely abandoned
by tenants with vouchers, and they are the most expensive to operate. If
they are sold to the highest bidders, some of these buildings will undoubt-
edly be torn down and the land put to some better use.
In general, if vouchers are the most cost-eﬀective method of providing
housing assistance to additional households, they are also the most cost-
eﬀective way to serve households currently living in housing projects.
However, two other objections to vouchering out public housing warrant
consideration.
One objection to this proposal is that it will force some tenants who pre-
fer to stay in their current units to move. This objection applies equally to
the current initiatives within the public housing program involving the
demolition or major rehabilitation of projects. When these activities occur,
displaced tenants are provided with tenant-based vouchers. It also applies
equally to similar activities in the unsubsidized housing market. Legal pro-
hibitions against this displacement are rare.
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56. During its ﬁrst term, the Clinton administration proposed this reform (HUD 1995).
Robert Dole made a similar proposal during his presidential campaign.Another objection to the proposal is that it will reduce the number of
aﬀordable housing units. The meaning of this objection is not entirely
clear. Since any dwelling is aﬀordable with suﬃcient subsidy, vouchering
out public housing does not change the number of aﬀordable units unless
it leads to a smaller housing stock. Even if vouchering out public housing
led to the demolition of more public housing units than pursuing current
policies, it does not follow that the total housing stock will be smaller on
that account. When vacancy rates fall, private unsubsidized construction
increases. Finally, this objection might refer to a reduction in the number
of apartments reserved for occupancy by subsidized households. However,
the advantages to assisted households or taxpayers of requiring subsidized
households to live in particular units in order to receive a subsidy have not
been explained. Among the disadvantages are the cost-ineﬀectiveness of
project-based assistance and the severe limitation on the tenant’s ability to
adjust his or her housing in response to changes in circumstances such as
job location.
Under all programs that provide substantial project-based assistance to
private parties who build or rehabilitate housing for low-income house-
holds, these parties agreed to provide housing meeting certain standards to
households with particular characteristics for a speciﬁed number of years.
At the end of the use agreement, the government must decide whether to
change the terms of the agreement, and the private parties must decide
whether to participate on these terms. Since the government provides
mortgage insurance for the overwhelming majority of these projects, it
must also decide whether to provide additional subsidies to these projects
when the private parties default on their loans or to sell these projects with-
out subsidies. When use agreements are not renewed, current occupants
are always provided with other housing assistance, usually tenant-based
vouchers.57 Up to this point, housing policy has leaned heavily in the di-
rection of providing owners with a suﬃcient subsidy to induce them to con-
tinue to serve the low-income households in their projects.
Given the evidence on the cost-eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent methods of de-
livering housing assistance, an obvious policy reform is not to renew any
use agreement and to provide the subsidized occupants of these projects
with tenant-based vouchers. The issues involved in this decision are the
same as those involved in the decision to voucher out public housing. How-
ever, it should be pointed out that for-proﬁt sponsors will not agree to ex-
tend the use agreement unless this provides higher proﬁts over the remain-
ing life of the project than operating in the unsubsidized market. Since these
subsidies are provided to selected private suppliers, the market mechanism
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57. Indeed, they have normally been given the option of staying in their current apartment
with the government paying the diﬀerence between the market rent of the unit and the stan-
dard tenant contribution or receiving the regular voucher that would be oﬀered to any house-
hold with the same characteristics.does not insure that proﬁts under the new use agreement will be driven
down to market levels. If this does not happen, it will be more cost-eﬀective
to provide the occupants of these units with tenant-based vouchers.
6.6 Summary and Conclusions
The primary justiﬁcation for housing subsidies to low-income house-
holds seems to be a desire on the part of many citizens to help these house-
holds combined with the view that many low-income households under-
value housing. To provide assistance consistent with this justiﬁcation, an
incredibly complicated system of housing programs has been developed,
involving much larger indirect subsidies than is common for means-tested
transfer programs. The total cost of this system exceeds the cost of other
better-known parts of the welfare system. Only Medicaid is larger. The ev-
idence on the major eﬀects of housing programs is sparse or old or both.
Based on this evidence, the eﬀects of low-income housing programs can be
summarized as follows.
In aggregate, all major housing programs increase housing consumption
substantially, and almost all signiﬁcantly increase consumption of other
goods. The increase in housing consumption is especially marked for new
construction programs in their early years. However, well before they reach
the midpoint of their useful lives these projects have provided less desirable
housing than the housing occupied by voucher recipients. All programs in-
crease aggregate housing consumption more than would occur if each par-
ticipant were given a cash grant equal to his or her housing subsidy.
The net eﬀect of these changes in consumption patterns is that housing
programs typically provide large beneﬁts to their recipients. Although
mean beneﬁt is large compared with their mean income, it is small com-
pared with the cost to taxpayers. The mean beneﬁt is about 75 percent of
the mean subsidy for construction programs and about 80 percent for
vouchers. For vouchers the cost to taxpayers exceeds the subsidy by the
modest administrative cost. For construction programs, the cost to tax-
payers is much larger than the sum of the subsidy and administrative cost.
The mean beneﬁt of each program varies inversely with income and di-
rectly with family size, but the variance in real beneﬁts among similar
households is large under most programs.
For the entire system of housing subsidies, the participation rate among
eligible households is far below 50 percent for each combination of income
and family size. For each family size, the participation rate ﬁrst rises and
then falls as income increases. The poorest households of each size have
very low participation rates. Within each income class, participation rates
are highest for one-person households, reﬂecting the strong preference re-
ceived by the elderly in housing programs.
Evidence on the eﬀect of housing programs on the characteristics of the
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that public housing tenants live in noticeably worse neighborhoods than in
the absence of the program and that the program contributes to racial seg-
regation in housing. Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilita-
tion and Section 8 certiﬁcates and vouchers appear to have modest eﬀects
in the opposite direction. The existing studies ﬁnd small positive eﬀects on
neighboring property values on average for some programs and small neg-
ative eﬀects for others. No study ﬁnds substantial positive eﬀects on aver-
age for any program.
Housing programs appear to have small work disincentive eﬀects. They
also have miniscule eﬀects on the prices of unsubsidized units that are not
located near subsidized units.
The most important ﬁnding of the empirical literature from the view-
point of housing policy is that tenant-based vouchers and certiﬁcates pro-
vide equally good housing at a much lower cost than any type of project-
based assistance that has been studied. This ﬁnding implies that a shift of
all discretionary resources from programs of project-based assistance to
tenant-based vouchers would enable us to provide several million addi-
tional households with adequate housing at an aﬀordable rent without any
increase in government expenditure.
The major issues in housing policy for low-income households are (a)
whether housing assistance should be an entitlement, (b) whether housing
subsidies should be delivered to additional households by building new
projects under some type of construction or substantial rehabilitation pro-
gram or by giving them housing vouchers, and (c) whether we should re-
quire households currently living in subsidized projects for which future
federal expenditure is discretionary to live in these projects to receive a
subsidy and should give their owners a suﬃcient subsidy to induce them to
continue to serve these households, or give these households housing
vouchers. The available empirical evidence has much to contribute to the
policy debate over these important questions. However, the magnitude of
the public expenditures involved argues for producing better information
on which to base these decisions. This evidence should be based on recent
data on the full range of major housing programs for low-income house-
holds.
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